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File: aacbd_03.txt1. Personnel: a. Problem: Several ALCE augmentees deployed without weapons, complete A and C bags, self-injectors and MEGP status on their orders. Fortunately we had a month and a half to acquire these items and any other necessary equipment for all deployed members. Mobility processing at home units was incomplete and proper information concerning required items in- theater did not get passed to mobility processing lines and home units. Too many times individuals ware told by their home units that they would receive required items when they arrive in country. Home units need to refrain from doing this just to get the people out of their hair. Solution: Timely and accurate information needs to be received by mobility processing units as well as home units to alleviate this problem. Possession of all required mobility items by the guard and reserves must be strictly enforced. Fix the problem at home before it becomes a problem in theatre. b. Problem: Guard and Reserve Aerial Port augmentees lacked proper training in engine running onload/offload (ERO) procedures which caused two avoidable serious injuries. Safety knowledge was weak at best when quarried bow to properly do an ER0. Aerial Port had the misconception that all aircraft would be held to their maximum scheduled ground time. These problems were much prevalent in the reserve components. Solution: Schedule and document more frequently ERO training during their training periods. This training needs to be observed and documented by active duty AF to ensure it is being accomplished and not pencil-whipped. ERO's were a necessity due to our heavy airflow and lack of adequate ramp space. c. Problem: Aerial Port leadership was very deficient in job knowledge, use of the chain of command and taking care of their people. Major William Burn, III, SMSgt A. Clary Sprouse and MSgt Thomas Copeland failed totally as the Senior Aerial Port supervisors at this location. APS tried to load cargo that had been red-lined for agriculture inspection. Knowledge of ER0 procedures were weak, ATOC operating procedures were very chaotic and how A/DACG operations were supposed to mesh into the operation was totally unknown to them. These are just a few examples of their poor job knowledge. The senior TR supervisors tried to run KKMC like a fixed port even when proven numerous times that it wouldn't work. On other occasions SMSgt Sprouse tried to coordinate plans in areas where he had no requirement or training to do so. Their was very little progress made in training new people in their tasks and flightline safety even though the ALCE commander highlighted the importance of these areas to Major Burn. On one instance Maj; Burn, SMSgt Sprouse and
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