Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Report 1

File: 120596_aacxh_12.txt
Page: 12
Total Pages: 53

UNCLASSIFIED

1. (U) PREFACE. This report examines the impact of weather and weather support on operations during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and details AWS con- tributions to the war effort. The report focus is on the Operation DESERT STORM war period of 15 Jan-28 Feb 91, although some contributions of weather support during Operation DESERT SHIELD are also discussed. We define Operation DESERT SHIELD as the period from 7 Aug 90 to 14 Jan 91. The transition date from Operation DESERT SHIELD to Operation DESERT STORM is defined by the United Nations resolution date of 15 Jan 91. First, we present the revision in air tactics that evolved quickly during the first several days of Operation DESERT STORM and how those tactics led to a change in weather support threshold fore- cast values. Next, we compare the actual weather with climatology.Then we present the evolution of weather support from the deployment phase through war phase to include specialized products, and forecast accuracy of selected products. Finally, this report presents some objective measurements of the value of weather support.

2. (U) OPERATIONAL WEATHER THRESHOLDS. Tactical training and offensive operations planning followed the traditional "European" scenario: low-level ingress, pop-up on target, and low-level egress which tacticians developed for surface- to-air missile (SAM) avoidance and counter air. By Day 3 (19 Jan 91), operational decision makers for the air campaign realized the principal
surface-to-air threat was anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Thus, on Day 3, operational mission profiles changed to maximize sortie effectiveness and minimize aircraft attrition. In response to the changed threat, US Central Command Air Forces CENTAF) directed weapons delivery missions be changed to mid- and high- altitude (above 10,000 feet) to avoid AAA. The weather support force accordingly tailored its forecast support to meet this requirement, and the primary operational weather threshold became ceilings below 10,000 feet. Ceilings below 10,000 feet were considered operationally unfavorable. This change in operational threshold increased the amount of time during Operation DESERT STORM targets were below weather thresholds from around 1-2 percent (for 1,000 foot ceilings) to about 33 percent of the time. Throughout the rest of this report, the primary operational weather threshold is 10,000 feet. In fact, ceilings below 10,000 feet became a conventional weather Tactical Decision Aid (TDA). Atch 1 contains the complete list of operational thresholds for all components and operations, except for USAFE Operation PROVEN FORCE elements based in Turkey.

3. (U) CLIMATOLOGY AND ACTUAL WEATHER. In his 15 Mar 91 briefing to the Pentagon Press Corps, Gen Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF), stated: "This was the worst weather in 14 years... it may have been the poorest weather in 100 years, but we only have records for 14 years," He added, "the weather was twice as bad as predicted." We believe he meant twice as bad as expected from climatology.

3.1. (U) CLIMATOLOGY. Analysis of the climatology in the Operation DESERT STORM area of responsibility (AOR) supports the CSAF statement that weather was twice as "bad" as one would expect from climatological data. Bad weather is defined as ceilings below 10,000 feet. The climatology baseline for the CSAF remark was 14 years of Real-Time Nephanalysis (RTNEPH) data archived from Air force Global Weather Central (AFGWC). RTNEPH data is a weighted analysis