Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Report 1

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were not absolute, and the forecaster could alter the favorable-marginal- unfavorable forecast subjectively. Since these forecasts included target forecasts, we can compare their skill to those for F-117. The contingency tables for Operation PROVEN FORCE mission forecasts from 28 Jan-28 Feb are displayed in Fig. 14. The figure gives forecast verification statistics using all three categories plus combines favorable and marginal forecasts and observed into a single favorable category, since marginal means the mission does have required thresholds. Operation PROVEN FORCE forecasts were extremely good, hitting go/no-go combined category conditions over 85 percent of the time.

5.3. (U) ARCENT. The pace of the war complicated weather support to Army forces during Operation DESERT STORM. The rate of movement of ground units during the 4-day ground war forced Army support SWOs to be "on the move" with their customers. Consequently, while planning support provided by the HO ARCENT SWO was similar to other components, execution products were very highly depend- ent on communications connectivity to get the forecast products to field units as soon as they set up. ARCENT instituted a special Contingency Weather Package (CWP) that focused on short-term operational requirements. The HQ ARCENT SWO mission was to provide timely and accurate weather information to HQ ARCENT (planning) and field SWOs (execution), provide weather briefing support to HQ ARCENT staff (planning), provide climatological and real-time data for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (primarily planning), provide climatological and scientific support (planning), provide information of weather effects on Army operations planning), and maintain operational control (OPCON) of subordinate SWO and weather teams administration).

5.3.1. (U) ARCENT Planning. The HQ ARCENT SWO support increased dramatically as forces transitioned from the force build-up phase to an offensive war phase. On 23 Jan 91, staff briefing support at HQ ARCENT expanded to four briefings per day. The ARCENT SWO provided the Commanding General (CG) a daily planning briefing, the G-3 Fire Support Element a 72-hour briefing for targeting, and the G-2 staff received two situational briefings per day at shift change. On 16 Feb 91, ARCENT requested two additional daily briefings to the Operations and Intelligence Center at shift-change. Finally, on 24 Feb 91, the CG requested an additional briefing. All briefings included a synoptic depiction, a 24-hour operations plain-language forecast for the AOR, a weather effects
(red-yellow-green forecast) matrix for the AOR, and light data. The ARCENT SWO also issued the ARCENT weather forecast twice daily. This product was a plain language general weather 72-hour forecast for Riyadh, Dhahran, and King Khalid Military City (KKMC). Another daily product was the AOR forecast for southern Iraq and the KTO, a plain language 72,-hour forecast distributed through C-2 channels. In addition, the ARCENT SWO issued other weather products upon request. The two most important execution support products for ARCENT mission planners and field weather teams were the TOAF and the COOP. The TOAF was tailored for Army operations from the DSFU JOAF. Specifically, the TOAF
forecast included cloud conditions, visibility, and winds in 12-hour blocks from 0-48 hours, while the JOAF only provided cloud specific forecasts for the first 24 hours. Additionally, the TOAF provided forecasts for two regions (east and west of 47 degrees east) which roughly correlated with VII and XVIII Corps boundary. The TOAF also provided guidance out to 5 days. On 12 Jan 91, HQ ARCENT SWQ issued their first TOAF. The CWP is discussed in greater detail below.

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