Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

5.3.2. (U) ARCENT Execution and Technical Goodness. ARCENT execution weather support blended products tailored locally from the TOAF and Contingency Weather Package (CWP). The ARCENT CG delegated operational decisions to the executing commander. On-site SWOs tailored products from the TOAF to support their customer's operations. Two factors made this a very difficult support problem. First, once the units moved from their rear assembly areas to their tactical assembly areas, ARCENT imposed radio listening silence (RLS). Second, once the battle began, division and armored cavalry regiment weather teams moved with their customers. The primary tactical communication systems for Army units is the High Frequency (HF) radio. Once RLS was in effect, units could receive information from ARCENT, but could not transmit weather data. This limited the amount of weather information available to other SWOs. The Signal Corps helped a alleviate part of this problem when they provided the SWOs dedicated AUTODIN (to Corps level) and shared AUTODIN (to Division/Regimental level) circuits to pass weather data. The ARCENT SWO countered the problem of providing weather support to a highly mobile force by issuing a CWP Atch 3. The CWPs focused on information required to get the SWO operational and "weather smart" after a "jump". The ARCENT SWO transmitted the CWP over the tactical HF net to the tactical unit. The CWP was a consolidation of the TOAF. When not on the move, the TOAF served as the foundation for operational support. SWOs at their field locations tailored the TOAF for their supported customer operational thresholds. For technical verification only the TOAF issued by HQ ARCENT from 8 Feb-28 Feb 91 are available. Fig 15 (West of 47 E) and Fig 16 (East of 47 E) show forecast accuracy, As with other products, a less than 10,000 foot ceiling was used for ARCENT verification, because this was a threshold (for AAA avoidance), and other thresholds (air assault, artillery) with low ceilings are not verifiable using RTNEPH.   RTNEPH can't differentiate small differences in low cloud elevation. We could not verify other thresholds.  The small sample size of the data base also diminishes the significance of these results, but the ARCENT forecasters also tied or beat persistence in all cases. 

5.4. (U) SOCCENT. HQ SOCCENT Staff Weather Office issued tailored planning forecasts and briefings based on the JOAF, but the actual execution forecasts were downloaded to the Air Force and Army components of SOCCENT. The staff support to HQ SOCCENT did not change from Operation DESERT SHIELD to Operation DESERT STORM. Weather support during DESERT STORM was conducted at home station (planning and execution) and at deployed location (execution). 

5.4.1. (U) Air Force Special Operations Planning. Weather briefing support during Operation DESERT STORM increased with the addition of a twice-a-day alert package for search and rescue missions. The package contained an area horizontal weather depiction, area plain language forecast, and forecasts for bases of interest.  The area plain language forecast included maximum pressure altitude, night vision goggles (NVG) ranges, temperatures, and minimum cloud ceilings. 

5.4.2. Air Force Special Operations Execution. Home station and deployed 1 location support was provided primarily by mission-specific flight briefings. T During the-Jan-Feb 91 period, 994 flight support briefings were provided. In addition, psychological operations' leaflet drop missions required precise wind forecasts, because of the effect of wind on leaflets. MC-130s had 17 leaflet drops from above 10,000 feet. Aircrew members calculated wind direction and speed as 94 and 98 percent correct, allowing successful mission completion.


		 25

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search