Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Report 1

File: 120596_aacxh_43.txt
Page: 43
Total Pages: 53

west just as winds were decreasing to the speed where the extraction could be made safely. The weather support allowed pickup at first possible instance without risking resources and having mission aborts due to weather.

7. (U) SUMMARY. Weather and weather support proved to be extremely critical during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Weather had more of an impact on operations than component commanders and planners had anticipated prior to the start of the war for two primary reasons first, the most serious enemy threat changed from SAMs and counter air to AAA. This change in enemy threat forced mission planners to change mission profiles from low-altitude ingress to staying above flight level 10,000. This change to a 10,000-foot operational threshold increased the amount of time weather conditions were below threshold values from 1-2 percent (as would have occurred for low-level flights) to over 33 percent of the time in the AOR for the high-altitude profile. Second, the weather during Operation DESERT STORM was significantly worse than expected from climatology, There was twice as much cloud cover below 10,000 feet as we expected from the climatological records. In spite of the poor weather, AWS forecasters at all levels and components significantly out performed several measures of "no-skill" forecasting for 0-72 hours. The AWS forecasts beat no- skill forecasts from 3 to over 15 percent for correct forecasts. For near-term forecasts (0-24 hours), AWS forecasters routinely out performed no-skill fore-- casts by over 10 percent. When these skill factors were applied to the operational planning and execution process, weather support produced a 9-percent increase in mission effectiveness. In operational terms, the numbers of PGMs placed on target in 43 days of the war would have taken 47 days to achieve with- out weather support--that is significant value added, and contribution to winning the war.