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File: 120596_aacxn_23.txtthreats to KFIA. b.(U) No barbed wire has been installed around the facility. RECOMMENDATIONS: (U ) a. (U) RAPCON personnel should use their break period outside observing the west perimeter for vehicle and personnel approaches. At night, personnel should use night vision devices to assist them in observing the perimeter. 3. PILOT BILLETING: ( U ) a. (U) The MABCO compound is located outside of established inner base perimeter security. The compounds which border MABCO on the north and south house TCN contractor personnel. b.(U) The single strand of concertina wire on top of the perimeter wall presents little problem for someone wishing to crawl over the top. c. (U) The east exterior (rear) of the compound is poorly lit at night and there are no obstructions preventing individuals or vehicles from approaching this perimeter wall. d. (U) Pilots and aircrews are housed closely together in a relatively small area of the compound. RECOMMENDATIONS (U) a. (U) Increase the amount of concertina wire on top of the perimeter wall to prevent easy access to the compound, especially on the east, north and south walls. b. (U) Increase evening lighting outside the east portion (rear) of the compound. c. (U) Disperse pilots and aircrew throughout the compound or provide a more hardened living environment for protection. 4. COMMUNICATIONS: (U) a. (U) Practice good ''OPSEC" and "COMSEC" procedures, especially b. (U) If possible, use only military members to operate the commercial telephone switches and the switchboard. Note: For military to control the switchboard, discussions with the commercial telephone company and host country government would be necessary. Additional qualified manpower and equipment would be needed to make the transition.
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