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File: 970207_aadcd_013.txtj. Additional Support elements (1) Observation: The members deployed to form the 5th TAC ASF were poorly equipped to construct and operate a field camp in the middle of the desert (2) Discussion: No AFSC's necessary to construct and maintain a field camp were part of the unit. Fortunately we had some personnel deployed with needed civilian experience who were able to help construct and maintain physical facilities. For example, by sheer luck, one Mental Health Technician (914X0) had some generator/power production experience. Without this person we would not have had power for two weeks after arriving. Many of the medical and administrative technicians were utilized as the security force for the camp at Al Jubail. Twenty four hour security meant that even with rotation, a few of our technicians got little or no training in their AFSC. (3) Recommendation: A prime beef team, radio operators and a contingent of guards Should augment ar APSS . k. Meals (1) Observation: The 5th TAC ASF received its meal support from a Marine dining hall twenty five minutes away from the compound. Meals were often cold, i11 prepared and lacked variety. (2) Discussion: Lack of adequate nutritional meals contributed to poor health of staff members. Many staff members ate "junk food" further contributing to poor nutrition. (3) Recommendation: A field kitchen with personnel properly trained in its operation should be part of the package for any group of more than two hundred individuals. (10) COMMANDER SUMMARY None of the deficiencies that have been noted were serious enough to affect operations although they may have made some people's jobs more difficult to perform. I feel that the above deficiencies can be worked out if serious effort is made to correct these situations for future operations if the "HUB'' concept of aeromedical evacuation operations is tc continue. 12
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