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File: 970207_aadcx_005.txt
Page: 005
Total Pages: 38

        
 
             DESERT SHIELD/STORM LESSONS LEARNED REPORT #C
         POC:                       /SGR, [(b)(2)]

         TITLE:     PDS System Availability
        
         OBSERVATION: The PDS system was not always available to
         respond to SG needs for call-up and mobilization
         transactions.
        
        DISCUSSION: Many problems were created due to the PDS
        system not being kept on line for our requirements to run
        strips, based on SG call-up and mobilization transactions,
        in a timely manner. SG, at one time, was forced to input
        several hundred transactions in an unnecessary hurry
        because the workers at AFMPC were due to go home on a
        Friday evening. Obviously this was inappropriate
        considering the serious contingency at the time. Dates and
        times of product production were constantly changed without
        SG being kept in the communications loop. Unnecessary
        crisis management could have been averted if SG had been
        provided a better opportunity for communication. SG had no
        point of contact at HQ AFMPC to help in this important
        communication loop. SG had to rely on HQ ARPC/RC to act as
        a go-between point of contact. This situation did not
        always work as desired.
        
        LESSONS LEARNED: Computer systems at HQ AFMPC must be
        available on short notice to respond to ARPC contingency
        requirements.
        
        RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: Arrive at some agreement with AFMPC
        concerning PDS systems availability during a contingency.
        AFMPC should run mobilization computer transactions daily.
        Points of contact at HQ AFMPC, HQ ARPC/RC, and HQ ARPC/SG
        must be established and utilized at the onset of any
        contingency.
        

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