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File: 970207_aadcx_005.txt
DESERT SHIELD/STORM LESSONS LEARNED REPORT #C
POC: /SGR, [(b)(2)]
TITLE: PDS System Availability
OBSERVATION: The PDS system was not always available to
respond to SG needs for call-up and mobilization
transactions.
DISCUSSION: Many problems were created due to the PDS
system not being kept on line for our requirements to run
strips, based on SG call-up and mobilization transactions,
in a timely manner. SG, at one time, was forced to input
several hundred transactions in an unnecessary hurry
because the workers at AFMPC were due to go home on a
Friday evening. Obviously this was inappropriate
considering the serious contingency at the time. Dates and
times of product production were constantly changed without
SG being kept in the communications loop. Unnecessary
crisis management could have been averted if SG had been
provided a better opportunity for communication. SG had no
point of contact at HQ AFMPC to help in this important
communication loop. SG had to rely on HQ ARPC/RC to act as
a go-between point of contact. This situation did not
always work as desired.
LESSONS LEARNED: Computer systems at HQ AFMPC must be
available on short notice to respond to ARPC contingency
requirements.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: Arrive at some agreement with AFMPC
concerning PDS systems availability during a contingency.
AFMPC should run mobilization computer transactions daily.
Points of contact at HQ AFMPC, HQ ARPC/RC, and HQ ARPC/SG
must be established and utilized at the onset of any
contingency.
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