24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 080596_jun96_decls21_0121.txt
Page: 0121
Total Pages: 253

Subject: 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT    

Box  ID: BX001437

Document Number:          2

Folder Title: 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT                                                             

Folder Seq #:        785

Unit: 24TH ID     

Parent Organzation: XVIII CORPS 







                                     UNCLASSIFIED
                                                                     05/30/91
                                   @LS LONG REPORT

          1. (U) TULLS NUMBER: 52166-71969 (00012), submitted by 2 BDE, 24
          ID, 870-5516, (912)767-5516.

          2. (U) No type OPN DESERT STORM NOTES conducted by 24 IN DIV (MECH)
          on 03/05/91.

          3. (U) KEYWORDS: COMBAT TRAINS, LOGISTICS, HEMTT, BRIGADE SUPPORT
          AREA, REFUEL, REARM, .

          4. (U) TITLE: UNIT COMBAT TRAINS

          5. (U) OBSERVATION: Due to the rapid attack of the brigade, the
          brigade support area was unable to maintain supporting distance
          with the maneuver battalions.

          6. (U) DISCUSSION: The configuration and positioning of the
          unit combat trains was critical in maintaining logistics
          resupply of the task forces. 2 Bde Task Force units placed all
          fuel and cargo HEMTT's in the combat trains in order to support
          the task force for at least 24 hours. Units also took
          additional measures such as reconfiguration of MKT's to
          transport additional MRE'S, placing civilian furl and water
          tanks on cargo HEMTT's and maximizing the load capacity of cargo
          HEMTT's to carry additional class V. A limitation of the combat
          trains was its capability to transport critical major assemblies
          such as MI FUPP's and MBS engines. Units restricted types of
          vehicles in the combat trains to those that had good
          cross-country mobility and could maintain the same speed as the
          combat vehicles. Because of the speed of the attack, rapid
          resupply of the force was critical to the mission. Units
          positioned the combat trains within the task force formation in
          order to provide security and instant support at each halt. In
          many cases, supply vehicles moved ahead of combat vehicles and
 of the forward line of troops.

          7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: units must maintain the flexibility in
          resupply to adapt Army doctrine to changing missions and
          scenarios.

          B. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Army should increase TO&E
          authorization for armor and infantry battalions by four fuel
          HEMTT's and four cargo HEMTT's to transport sufficient fuel,
          class V, and major end items to support themselves. TO&E
          increase should also include a truck capable of carrying at
          least 1000 gallons of potable water. All TO&E increases should
          be aimed at allowing battalions to be self-sufficient for at
          least 24 hours of offensive operations.



              (U) SUBJECT: LOGISTICS


                                       Page - 15

                                     UNCLASSIFIED

Document 253 f:/Week-22/BX001437/24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT/24th mech inf div operation desert storm after a:08029615062350
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001437
Unit = 24TH ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq # = 785
Subject = 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER A
Document Seq # = 50
Document Date =
Scan Date = 12-JUN-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-AUG-1996