Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

File: 080596_jun96_decls21_0173.txt
Page: 0173
Total Pages: 253

Subject: 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT    

Box  ID: BX001437

Document Number:          2

Folder Title: 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT                                                             

Folder Seq #:        785

Unit: 24TH ID     

Parent Organzation: XVIII CORPS 






                                        UNCLASSIFIED
                                                                           05/30
                                      JULLS LONG REPORT

            I. (U) @LS NUMBER: 50852-28665 (00002), submitted by ALL UN---
            24 ID, 870-5516, (912)767-5516.

            2. (U) Other OPN DESERT STORM NOTES conducted by 24 IN DIV (MECH)
            on 03/05/91.

            3. (U) KEYWORDS: MULTICHANNEL, TACSAT, COMKUNICATION, OFFENSIVE,

            4. (U) TITLE: MULTICIUUINEL VERSUS TACSAT IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

            5. (U) OBSERVATION: The divisional multichannel nodes were
            unable to keep pace with offensive operations.

            6. (U) DISCUSSION: The multichannel node support plan planned
            for thorough coverage throughout each phase of the battle.
            However, it did not account for the rapid escalation of the time
            table, location of the LD, and the fast pace of offensive
            operations. In more than one instance for a maneuver brigade
            during the operation, there was no node within range to shoot
            into for several hours. This delay, caused by the fast pace of
            the operation, forced dependence on non-TO&E single channel
            TACSAT.

            7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: During the battle, TACSAT served as the
            only means of communication. It served as the division command,
            admin/log, and operations and intelligence net.

            8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: The single channel TACSAT should be
            a division's primary C2 communications link on the offense to
            all CP's, the maneuver brigades, other MSC'S, and separate
            battalions in order to maintain quick, reliable, and secure
            communication over extended distances. Furthermore, it must be
            able to operate while on the mdve.



                (U) SUBJECT: CO,@ICATIONS

                (U) INTEROPERABILITY: MATERIEL

   (U) Lesson distributed by: 24TH IN DIV.












                                          Page - 2

                                        UNCLASSIFIED

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search


Document 253 f:/Week-22/BX001437/24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT/24th mech inf div operation desert storm after a:08029615062350
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001437
Unit = 24TH ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq # = 785
Subject = 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER A
Document Seq # = 50
Document Date =
Scan Date = 12-JUN-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-AUG-1996