LESSONS LEARNED FROM 11 JULY BLAST

File: 102896_aug96_decls13_0001.txt
Page: 0001
Total Pages: 2

Subject: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 11 JULY BLAST                              

Unit: 22D SUPCOM  

Parent Organization: ARCENT      

Box ID: BX005152

Folder Title: FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORTS  OCT-NOV                                                             

Document Number:          1

Folder SEQ  #:          6






          .4,



                            LESSONS LEARNED FROM 11 JULY BLAST

             1. There was much destruction of the tentage material to include
             burning and penetration holes from shells and schrapnel and many
             munitions subsequently found inside the tent areas rendering the
             hospital very difficult to clear by EOD. The EOD teams had
             previously cleared the hospital area five times and each time
             more munitions were found by some of our hospital personnel when
             returning to start cleaning, etc. Finally, a subsequent EOD team
             literally had to take the hospital tentage area apart piecemeal
             which destroyed it and even then more      munitions were found
             similiar to those which had killed some of the original EOD
             personnel.

             The lesson learned was that one of the weak areas of the DEPHEDS
             Hospital is the tentage material between the iso containers. The
             material burns and affords little protections against flying
             fragments or munitions and is nearly impossible to clean and
             clear when anti personnel mines are scattered in the area. The
             tentage also permits sand and dust to enter many areas which is
             bad for personnel especially in surgery and also for equipment
             such as computers which we learned.

             2. The metallic iso containers were the safe haven for many of
             the personnel in the hospital while the blasts continued. Judging
             from the dents they received from munition and/or schrapnel
             damage, they provided significant protection and probably saved
             lives. We were about 90 meters away from ground zero of the blast
             area. The most severely injured soldier was much farther than our
             hospital and personnel. Likewise, the hospital was littered with
ld have caused death or
             dismemberment of our patients and staff and yet none were so
             injured. So many others were injured that were significantly
             farther than we were-we give the Almighty thanks for protection.

             3. Much of the critical monitoring and other sensitive medical
             equipment that was in the iso containers was protected and
             salvageable. It was noted that some of the sensitive lab, xray,
             and operating room equipment were damaged by falling off tables,
             etc. It would be wise to find bettor ways to secure them to
             tables in the iso containers or to have them built into special
             wall or floor mounted stands so they would be less likely to
             receive damage. This damage has occurred in transport/movement as
             well. This type of arrangement would also help in setting up
             these areas more quickly for use.

             4. Another aspect of protection that needs to be addressed is
             protection from NBC in our hospital areas. Since we knew that
             Iraq had used various chemical warfare agents and since we know
             now that he was closer than thought to nuclear capability, we
             should be better prepared against both for our staff and
             patients. The ability to protect against both would be much
             easier if we had better ways to connect our iso containers with
             some type ofneoprene/nylon accordion like sleeves with a sealing

Document 2 f:/Week-34/BX005152/FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORTS OCT-NOV/lessons learned from 11 july blast:10019616505867
Control Fields 17
File Room = aug96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-34
Box ID = BX005152
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORTS OCT-NOV
Folder Seq # = 6
Subject = LESSONS LEARNED FROM 11 JULY BLAST
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 01-OCT-1996