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File: 123096_jul96_decls5_0012.txt
Page: 0012
Total Pages: 16

Subject: OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW               

Unit: 3D BDE  2AD 

Parent Organization: 1ST ID      

Box  ID: BX001994

Folder Title: INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW                                                                      

Document Number:          2

Folder Seq  #:        101









           Enclosure 1, 2AD (FWD) AEUAD-GS, Memorandum, Subject: OPERATION
           'ESERT STORM Intelligence Review, 8 April 1991.

           (-I. How did the RGFC units fight when compared to other Iraqi Army
           -tnits?


           -@(i Brigade did not encounter RGFC forces in area of
           L,sponsibility. The only possible RGFC force encountered was 3 BMP
            observed but not engaged by 3-66 AR.

           .i. Did Friendly operations surprse Iraqi units you engaged? What
           -2+fL-ct did surprise have?

             1-41 IN: TF surprised Iraqis with how well they maneuvered. The
           ,raqis were probably relieved when we captured them.

           71- 3-66 AR: Yes, friendly operations were a complete surprise to
           .raqis based on EPW reports. They simply did not expect to see
           ,@i:ier i cans.


           '-66 AR: Yes, they -an.

           .@98 SB-. Yes, minimum resistance.

             9DE rAC: Enemy was constantly withdrawing.

               What is your assessment of enemy battlefield operating systems?

           .F 1-41 IN: Maneuver - they did know how to maneuver against an
           opposing armored force; Fires - during the TF Iron counterrecon
           .a,ittle rF assessed that Iraqi's knew how to put artillery on target;
           1-ite.IligL,nce - during TF Iron colinterrc?con battle the Iraqis knew
           '-lie capabilites and ranges of our weapon systems. They also knew
           ;iow far to stand off from our weapon systems; C2 - they had modern
           -adios and an elaborate system of bunkers, they Iraqis couldn't
           :ommand and control a fast paced fluid
           -)-kttle; Logistics - Iraqi troops were in bad shape because of
           @2vered supply lines to forward units; ADA - Soviet air defense
           Lys-lems didn't provide the Iraqis adeqLLeate protection; Engineers -
             did not encounter many obstacles.

             @-66 AR: Maneuver - NIA; Fires - N/A; Intelligence - poor; C2 -
          .oor; Logistics - poor; ADA - ineffective; Engineers - good in
           ,,repared static defense but poor in mobility.

           "-66 AR: Maneuver - unknown; Fires     none; Intelligence -
           'lLt2St).onable; C2 - poor; Logistics no base, unable to feed and
           li.ovide water to personnel, had large supply of ammunition an hand
           .n defensive positions.

           ,(.19 SB: Maneuver - slow moving, obsolete equipment and infexibIL-
           ..'I; Fires - not observed; Intelligence - Good enemy deception
           '-eciiniques employed; C2 - Not flexible, centralized control;
           .-logistics - dsrLLptL-d by coalition air, several days of ammunition
           .,jod; ADA - Not observed; Engineers - Not observed.

                                            E-4-'@


                                   F-GR SF-FfEiAt= tiSF= 81!t:','

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Document 16 f:/Week-28/BX001994/INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW/operation desert storm intelligence battle revie:12179611152531
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001994
Unit = 3D BDE 2AD
Parent Organization = 1ST ID
Folder Title = INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW
Folder Seq # = 101
Subject = OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIE
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996