OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW

File: 123096_jul96_decls5_0013.txt
Page: 0013
Total Pages: 16

Subject: OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW               

Unit: 3D BDE  2AD 

Parent Organization: 1ST ID      

Box  ID: BX001994

Folder Title: INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW                                                                      

Document Number:          2

Folder Seq  #:        101







                                           FBR BFF-iE!Ai= USE Bedl=@'


              @-nclosure 1, '-AD (FWD) AEUAD-BB, Memorandum, Subject: OPERATION
              :)ESERR STORM Intelligence Battle Review, 8 April 1991.


              32 BDE TAC: Maneuver - Unknown; Fires - Unknown; Intelligence -
              'oor, although officers knew enough to leave three days early; C2 -
              '@oor; Logistics - Average; ADA - unknown; Engineers - Very good.

                   Did the reaction of Iraqi forces surprise your unit in any way?

              @'F 1-41 IN: Yes, during the TF iron coun@lerrecon battle TF thought
              'he Iraqis would fight because their reconnaissance was generally
              Liggressive. They would come forward, stand off about 3km, and
              :-oturn to their original positions. TF S2 believed that the Iraqis
              :-few what they were doing and they seemed to be experienced.
              .,robably the EPW reports were correct and they were in very bad
              sl-iape.

              :F 3-66 AR: The lack of Iraqi resistance was a surprise.

              '-66 AR: Only to take advantage of friendly direct +ire systems.

              ,@98 SB: Yes, much less resistance than e:zpected.

              -;-- BDE TAC: We expected more resistance. Also, EPWs expected to be
              j;@ecuted by coalition forces.

              4. Assess the quality of intelligence from Corps/Theater. What
              .jas the quality and volume of reporting/intelligence from your
              Subordinate units?

              'F 1-41 IN: From Corps and Theatre it was great because we new
              Llieir capabilities and how the enemy was arrayed. We had sufficient
              intelligence from higher levels to learn, study, and execute
              Operations against the Iraqi Army. With the information from our
              @Ltbordinate companies/teams the TF did not develop the battle well.
 reporting results of
              ,rigagements was also weak. The TF BDA count does not compare with
              -hc? company commanders BDA count.

              .'F 3-66 AR: Intelligence received from national, theatre, and corps
              -evel was  excellent during preparation +or ground phase of war.
              :-ollowing initial breach operation intelligence flow ceased. Spot
              .-cporting from CO/TMs was good and valuable flank information was
              4,ailned by eavesdropping on higher and adjacent units command nets.

              -'-66 AR:  The bad spot reports from CO/TMs gave the TF an unclear
              ,)ic'@ure. After TF crossed border, intelligence from higher
              Headquarters was lacking. -.F operated on ntelligence gained from
              CO/TM's. Brigade could not give us intelligence until wL, were set
              .n i@uwal@,.

              -;98 SB: The Battalion experienced periodic problems coordinating
              .@i@lh Counterintelligence-IPW Team from 101st MI BN due to lack of
              ii",W oraanic communications.

                                                      E-1-6


                                           r,t5ft arr-tetmi= USE

Document 16 f:/Week-28/BX001994/INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW/operation desert storm intelligence battle revie:12179611152531
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001994
Unit = 3D BDE 2AD
Parent Organization = 1ST ID
Folder Title = INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW
Folder Seq # = 101
Subject = OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIE
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996