OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW

File: 123096_jul96_decls5_0014.txt
Page: 0014
Total Pages: 16

Subject: OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW               

Unit: 3D BDE  2AD 

Parent Organization: 1ST ID      

Box  ID: BX001994

Folder Title: INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW                                                                      

Document Number:          2

Folder Seq  #:        101





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           Enclosure 1, 2AD (FWD) AEUAD-GB, Memorandum, Subject: OPERATION
           JESERT STORM Intelligence Battle Review, 9 April 1991.


           32 BDE TAC: Quality from subordinates was adequate. SPOTREPS at
           @ompany level need training. Received extremely little intelligence
           -'rom Division. Perceived weakness was DTACs loss of communications
           ;ith D-OC, and possibly DTOCs loss of comns with Corps G-2. Totally
           :iiadequ,ite intelligence support.

           -5. What were the technological advantages, if any, encountered
           .,,ga3.nst Iraqi Forces? (Tanks, APCS, Helos, etc.) What problems
           )ere encountered?


             1-41 IN: The TF saw no technological advantages and encountered
           .io problems.

           'F 'I-66 AR: TF was superior to Iraqis in all areas. The MIAI and
           .ts thermal capabilities were the most decisive advantage.

           @-66 AR: No comment.


           198 SD: Identification of friendly or enemy ground force force
           /ehxcles by coalition ground and air forces resulted in fraticide.

           S'- BDE TAC: N/A; enemy withdrew, limited direct fires had no
           !,.stinct vulvernabilities.


           16. What were the effects on the units you encountered to the air
           @ampaign? To friendly artillery'.' To direct fire? Which, in your
           opinion, had the greatest effect?

           F 1-41 IN: The TF S2 assessment is that the air campaign and
           ir4endly artillery destroyed so much equipment the he lost his will
           -0 fight. The air campaign, indirect, and direct +ire in that order
           .lad the most effect.


           .F '@-66 AR: Enemy units wered reduced Lo critical levels in
           -ogistl=s and were experiencing severe morale and desertion
           problems.

           2-66 AR: Close air support destroyed 3 T-55, 6 Trucks and 3 MTLB in
           .'F sector.


 Cannot distinguish which type of firepower system was most
           -?Ffective. Air campaign had a cumulative effect on Iraqi troops.
           .)ireat and indirect effects had the most definitive effect once the
           ,)a@ltie was joined with the enemy.

           :;-- BDE TAC: Air campaign devastated enemy will to fight. There was
           .iot enough information at the TAC to make and assessment on the
           affect of artillery.

           .,7. Was the PSYOPS campaign successful against the units you
           ..iced@ Were the leaflets or loudspeakers more effective? Friendly
           .ztdio broadcasts?


                                           E-1-7


                                  F-CIP; gr-F-ir.IA6 6)rsrt gPj6Y

Document 16 f:/Week-28/BX001994/INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW/operation desert storm intelligence battle revie:12179611152531
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001994
Unit = 3D BDE 2AD
Parent Organization = 1ST ID
Folder Title = INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIEW
Folder Seq # = 101
Subject = OPERATION DESERT STORM INTELLIGENCE BATTLE REVIE
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996