ENCOUNTERS WITH COMBAT ENGINEERS PERFORMING EOD RELATED TASK

File: 123096_sep96_decls13_0001.txt
Page: 0001
Total Pages: 2

Subject: ENCOUNTERS WITH COMBAT ENGINEERS PERFORMING EOD RELATED TASK    

Unit: 22D SUPCOM  

Parent Organization: ARCENT      

Box  ID: BX005555

Folder Title: 512TH EODCT CHRONICLE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS                                                     

Document Number:          4

Folder Seq  #:          2








                                        DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                           512th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Control Team
                            146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment
                            King Aziz Port Facility, Dammam, Saudi Arabia
                                             APO NY 09616



      EOD-IE                                                                         14 June 1991

      MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, lst Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal
                        Control Group), Provisional, APO NY 09772

      SUBJECT:   Encounters with Combat Engineers Performing EOD-related Tasks


      I . On 2 April 1991, the 146th Ord Det (EOD) responded to a request to destroy the
      Iraq Air Force and Army Ammunition Storage sites at Tallil Airbase in Iraq.

      2.  Upon entering the a-my ASP, we discovered that a majority of the ammunition
      storage buildings, or igloos [Photo #11, which stored army ordnance munitions, were
      already prepared for demolition, possibly by the C Company 307th Engineer Battalion.

      3. After reviewing the demolition procedures, we determined that the demolition
      set-ups would not be efffective for the following reasons:

          A.   Det cord branch lines connected to the ring main, or main trunk line, were
      not securely attached; unsecure connections could result in misfires.

          B. No blasting caps, electric or non-electric, were utilized. (Photo #31

               1. Branch lines leading into the bunkers were attached to the high
      explosives by using det cord knots or wrapping det cord around the priming charge.
      This practice reduces the possibility of a detonation.

               2. No firing train set-ups were located throughout the ASP. This
      deficiency raises the following questions:

                   A.) What was the mode of initiation?

                   B.) Why were the demolition procedures initiated but not completed?
     C.) Except for initiating devices, the AS? was primed for detonation.
      Why was the area left unsecured?

          C.   Various demolition charges were used in the set-ups: US C-4 (MI12 Blocks)
      and British PE-4 (a plastic explosive). (Photo #31

          D.   Some primed charges were not connected to any munitions destined for
      destruction. Without explosive continuity, incomplete destruction will result.
      [Photos #4 and #51

          E. A det cord branch line was found wrapped around an M18-series claymore anti-
      personnel mine, apparently for use as a demolition charge.        This mine is not
      authorized for use in this manner.

Document 2 f:/Week-46/BX005555/512TH EODCT CHRONICLE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS/encounters with combat engineers performing eod :12179611162899
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-46
Box ID = BX005555
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = 512TH EODCT CHRONICLE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
Folder Seq # = 2
Subject = ENCOUNTERS WITH COMBAT ENGINEERS PERFORMING EOD
Document Seq # = 4
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996