AAR COMMENTS ODS AND DS 14TH PREVENTION MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91

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Subject = AAR COMMENTS ODS AND DS 14TH PREVENTION MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91

Box ID = BX000284

Folder Title = AAR COMMENTS OPERATION DESERT SHIELD STORM 14TH PREVENTIVE MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91

Unit = VII CORPS

Parent Org = ARCENT

d, 'l.itarization line in Iraq in its forward sector as well as the sector
fully occupied by XVIII Corps to the west of the VII Corps sector. In
concert with that mission, the mission of the 14th and its subordinate units
was modified to provide PM and VS support over a much wider and longer area of
operations (AO) than previously during the ground battle. In addition, the
14th was given the assignment to provide PM support for the refugee/displaced
civilian camp at Safwan, in southeastern Iraq.

4. Mobilization/Pre-Deployment Lessons Learned

a. A Mobilization Team is Needed.

(1) Issue: The unit's mobilization was very inefficient due to its own
former mobilization officer and former commander.
(2) Discussion: The unit's former mobilization officer did a very poor job
in preparing and updating the unit mobilization plan and its various annexes.
He did not coordinate the plan effectively with the mobilization station prior
to mobilization and many key elements of the plan were missing or in error.
Upon activation, he refused to report early for duty and did not actively
participate in the mobilization process. No one else in the unit was aware of
the plan or its problems until after the unit was activated. The former
commander did not know any details of the plan, nor did he take the initiative
to become aware of its contents. At the mobilization station, a new
mobilization officer was appointed and the commander was relieved. The
mrl@ilization process was then carried out by a team, under the direction of a
r. mobilization officer and commander, both of whom assumed their duties at
th mobilization station. This resulted in considerable inefficiencies by the
un4@ during the first week to ten days of mobilization, a situation which
should not have been tolerated and which delayed the unit's deployment
schedule.
(3) Recommendation: Appoint a unit mobilization team, consisting of
representatives from command/control, unit administration, unit supply and
unit training sections.

b. Supply Shortages are War-Stoppers.

(1) Issue: Upon mobilization, the unit was short several
mission-essential items such as water-testing chemicals, rat bait, fly bait
and repellant (DEET). In addition, desert camouflage uniforms (DCUS) and
related garments were not issued prior to mobilization and were not issued at
the mobilization station.
(2) Discussion: Logistical support during mobilization, as well as after
deployment to SWA, was not sufficient to meet the mission requirements.
Sufficient, accessible stockages of essential supplies were not available;
local purchase procedures at the mobilization station and in SWA were needed
to fill supply system shortages and these shortages were not filled with
satisfactory substitutes or to the required levels. The unit was constantly
told it would get its supply shortages at the next station (i.e., if not at
FLW, then at Dammam; if not at Dammam, then at the field site). In actuality,
the next station had shortages in worse condition than the previous station.
there was no re-supply system in SWA. If a unit needed an item, it better
V '-I that item with it in adequate quantities to last the duration of
jyment because the item wasn't going to be re-supplied in SWA. Shortage
of critical Class IX items and their lack of availability in SWA caused units
to cannibalize other vehicles or to "obtain"parts by other means. Hospital
units (EVACS, CSHs and MASHS) were desperately short of medicines, supplies