AAR COMMENTS ODS AND DS 14TH PREVENTION MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91

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Subject = AAR COMMENTS ODS AND DS 14TH PREVENTION MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91

Box ID = BX000284

Folder Title = AAR COMMENTS OPERATION DESERT SHIELD STORM 14TH PREVENTIVE MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91

Unit = VII CORPS

Parent Org = ARCENT

a--"'-)Iood when they deployed and most of them only had 7 to 10 days stockages
the ground war began. Peacetime stockages don't work in wartime
situations; if the next war is in Samalia, local purchase agents won't do us
any good. We may not have 4 - 5 months in-country preparation for the next
war either.
(3) Recommendation: Provide required wartime levels of supplies available
for rapid issue.

C. Mobilization Station Information was Erroneous

(1) Issue - Information regarding deployment to SWA provided by the unit's
mobilization station was usually in error.
(2) Discussion - The Mobilization Control Center (MCC) at the mobilization
station provided numerous items of information, which constantly changed
during the unit's stay at FLW, or was not correct. In an effort to push the
unit out to the theater, the MCC often gave guidance which later proved to be
incorrect. Examples include supplies.and DCU clothing, for which the unit was
told "you'll get it in Theater". Another example was the allowable weight and
size of equipment pallets; the 14th was told 2 or 3 different sizes and even
had to re-arrange equipment on the morning of departure to the APOD because
the requirements changed again. At the APOD (Scott AFB), the unit was advised
that it could have arranged the pallets the size and weight they were
originally. Other examples of misguidance are too numerous to mention. This
lack of accurate communication may not have been the fault of the MCC but in
as much as the MCC had previously deployed several other unit prior to the
14th, the information should have been more accurate by the time 14th was
Mc lized. The continuous changes in guidance distracted from the training
a other mobilization requirements. An old adage applies: "Order followed by
R,-Order leads to Disorder."
(3) Recommendation - Disseminate mobilization/deployment guidance to all
mobilization station MCCs in a timely manner and minimize the changes
thereafter.

S. Deployment Lessons Learned

a. Reorganize the Medical Brigade.

(1) Issue - The Medical Brigade has no organic engineer, transportation,
.communications, maintenance or logistics support.
(2) Discussion - The Medical Brigade to which the 14th was assigned (332d
Med Bde from Nashville, TN) consisted of two Medical Groups (one for MASHS,
one for CSHs)., a Task Force Evac (for the Evac hospitals), a PM command, a
dental detachment and a psychiatric detachment. It had no organic engineer,
transportation, commo, maintenance or logistics support and was dependent on
the VII Corps COSCOM for these services. The COSCOM, however, also had the
maneuver divisions, corps artillery and other combat elements to support and
they were higher-priority customers. The COSCOM and did not provide the
needed level of support in a timely manner to the Medical Brigade. As a
result, the brigade was not often able to fulfill its mission requirements on
schedule during combat. This could have resulted in unnecessary loss of lives
had the ground battle been of longer duration.
'3) Recommendation - Restructure the Corps - level medical organization,
t iclude an organic services battalion.

b. Reorganize the Environmental Sanitation (LB) Teams