NBC OVERVIEW

File: 980420_sep96_decls1_0023.txt
Page: 0023
Total Pages: 43





        1.  (U) Julls number,             submitted by lith ADA BDE S2,
        Cpt. Weiner, (915)568-1370.

        2.  (U) Operation Desert Shield 90, Aug 90.

        3.  (U) Keywords: BDE S2, Deployment Phase.
        4.  (U) Title: Timeliness of Intelligence information.
        5.  (U) Observation: Timeliness of intelligence information from
        higher headquarters (XVIII ABN Corps, ARCENT) improved as the
        Operation unfolded.

        6. (U) Discussion:
            a. (U) During Operation Desert Shield, the intelligence
        summaries provided by Corps were 24-36 hours old. ARCENT averaged
        36 hours.
            b. (U) The Bde has no collection assets and is reliant on
        the intelligence support from higher and other service
        intelligence agencies. The Bde S2 had seven battalions to support
        that were spread out throughout the theater. Due to this,
        subordinate units required Intell support from the closest
        division. There were inconsistencies at the division supporting
        that ADA Battalion from what the Bde S2 was disseminating from
        EAC. C. (U) Response to requests for intelligence information
        (RII's) were untimely. Numerous RIIfs required DIA's response
        which normally took too long i.e. in some cases as many as 10
        days. The untimeliness and at tines inconsistent response with
        the theater collection reports on the TBM threat for example,
        complicated the analytical process and validation on the real
        threat.
            d. (U) The outdated Intell received from higher headquarters
        which was later disseminated the the Bdo's subordinates, was more
        historical data than timely tactical intelligence/information.

        7. (U) Lesson Learned.
            a. A dedicated intelligence net that links the subordinate
        units may assist in overcoming the untimely and inconsistent
        intelligence. This net can be the focal point for the battalions
        to exchange their information and reports with the Bde. In
        addition it may help shorten the physical distance.

            b. Establish and maintain a message center at Bde IlQs
        (forward element). The message center established at KKMC by th
        SIGO during Operation Desert Storm afforded quick access to the
        message traffic from higher headquarters.

            c. Most importantly, the Bdo FWD element should collocate
        with the Air Force CRC for additional message center support from
        the joint forces. The timeliness of message traffic from the AF



                                     II-B-152
Box ID = BX000533
Folder Title = 11TH AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BDE DESERT SHIELD STORM AAR VOL 1                                    
Unit = ARCENT      
Parent = CENTCOM     
Subject = NBC OVERVIEW