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File: 980420_sep96_decls1_0022.txt
1. (U) Julls number, I submitted by ilth ADA BDE S2,
Cpt. Weiner, (915)568-1370.
2. (U) operation Desert Shield 90, Aug 90.
3. (U) Keywords: BDE S2, Deploynent Phase.
4. (U) Title: Inadequate Transportation was experienced by the
initial BDE S2 personnel deployed.
5. (U) Observation: Inadequate transportation was experienced by
the initial BDE S2 personnel deployed.
6. (U) Discussion:
a. (U) Due to the short notification and hasty deployment,
the BDE did not deploy sufficient transport vehicles to be able to
conduct necessary operations.
b. (U) The S2 element had no means to travel to Corps or
other Intell agencies to quickly establish Intell support.
C. (U) The establishment of TBM defense for critical
facilities overcame the intelligence support that was maturing
within theater.
7. (U) Lesson Learned. Establish the intelligence priority with
the existing support in the Area of Operation prior to deployment.
Deploy the necessary personnel and transport equipment to
alleviate the undue hardship.
8. (U) Recommended Actions:
a. (U) Establish a dedicated S2 not from BDE to higher, from
BDE to BN. The FM radio could be a considered means and/or the
MCS computer system with terminals to link with each battalion.
b. (U) Maintain a message center at BDE IIQ'S. The message
center established at KKMC during operation Desert Storm made a
positive difference in the time Intell traffic was received. The
time of receipt was averaged between 6 to 12 hours, compared to
the 24-36 hours from Corps/Arcent.
II-B-151
Box ID = BX000533
Folder Title = 11TH AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BDE DESERT SHIELD STORM AAR VOL 1
Unit = ARCENT
Parent = CENTCOM
Subject = NBC OVERVIEW
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