AAR 10 MAR 91

File: 980409_sep96_decls21_0002.txt
Page: 0002
Total Pages: 3
Subject = AAR   10 MAR 91                                                 

Box ID = BX003207

Folder Title = 730TH MEDICAL COMPANY-CLEARING AAR                                                              

Unit = OTSG        

Parent Org = HSC         













              At this point no one in the subordinate units was sure of the
              exact route. The MASH unit Commander was in charge of the convoy
              safety briefing and actual convoy. There were no strip maps,
              briefing as to fuel stops, checkpoints or routes, or briefing as
              to what to do if lost or separated from the convoy, or under
              attack. The only information given was to stay behind the vehicle
              directly in front of you, at a 25 meter interval. Radio
              frequencies used and call signs were not established in the
              convoy briefing but were put out by the Bn Commander at a
              separate commanders briefing, because the Convoy Commander
              failed to do so. During the convoy the convoy was stopped, but
              unit commanders were never informed by the lead element why or
              how long the convoy would be stopped. Some stops would be for
              hours, and no one in the convoy would wake up the MASH unit
              drivers, so part of the convoy would move and the rest stay put;
              when it was realized that the entire convoy was not moving the
              vehicles that had moved were stopped, and the rest of the
              vehicles brought up. This caused long delays. At other times,
              the stops for the rear vehicles might last for only a minute or
              two. In my opinion the convoy could very easily have been in
              danger from any active enemy force, due to the fact that the
              convoy was frequently splintered, and we never know whether to
              put out guards to provide security once we were through the
              breach.

              4. When we arrived at Log Base Nelligan the 217th Med Bn
              Commander took a detachment of his personnel, the 42nd Med Co
              (GA) and our lst Clearing Platoon, and headed to a forward
              location to provide medical support for the lst Cav. The
              Headquarters and 3rd Platoons stayed at this location and set up
              support operations. The Third Clearing Platoon set up Sick Call
              and Ward operations at Log Base Nelligan from 1-6 March, with 107
              patients seen, 4 held on Ward and approximately 10 evacuated via
              air and ground ambulance to rear medical treatment facilities.
              Operations were terminated on 6 March for movement back to 332nd
              Med Bde site on 7 March. The lst Platoon moved to a forward
              location approximately loo miles Northeast, and established a
              Sick Call facility. Some 22 patients were treated at this
              facility. The facility was disestablished on 5 Mar 91, and the
              Platoon left to return to the 332nd Brigade site.

              5. Even with the problem areas noted above this unit accomplished
              its mission, with no injuries or casualties within our element.

              6. Recommendations:

                a. Recommend all medical units put in support of a Division be
              put under the command of the Battalion.