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File: 0000006.txt
Page: 0006
Total Pages: 7

    




    start of clean-up operations on 11 July and the explosion on 23
    July, des~ite the departure of the commander on 16 July. The
    group commander did talk to the detachment commander and,
    subsequently, to the acting detachment commander -on the telephone
    a number of times.
    
             (5)  The acting commander,               regardless
    of technical competence, lacked the command and leader experienci
    required for an operation of this magnitude and duration.
    devoted more time to hands-on work than to supervision.
    
        k. One final note on findings. The investigation did not
    uncover the specific reason for the explosion. It did, however,
    disclose practices and attitudes that led to unsafe acts,
    incr.eased risk, and created circumstances in which an accident
    wasp2ore likely to occur. The two EOD NCOs, taking every
    postible precautionary step, may have still been killed.
    Properly cautioned, attired, and confined to a safe area, the
    ,,,tii 'ACA soldier may not have died.
    
    3. Recommendations.
    
        a.  increase supervision and command involvement in the Doha
    unexpladed ordnance clearance operation. Establish an Explosive
    Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Control Team (-) with a field grade
    officer in charge to oversee technical performance and monitbr
    human factors such as fatigue and frustration throughout the
    theater,                                               't, the.
            with initial emphasis on, and close supervision o
    Doha clean-up. The Control Team should work for the 111th
    Ordnance Group.
    
          b.    Require all 146th ordnance Detachment members, and any
    other EOD personnel who help in the Doha effort, to review,all
    applicable publications and procedures, especially those relating
    to render safe procedures and safety for the particular munitions
    encountered.
    
          c.    Require all EOD personnel involved in the Doha clearance
    operation to follow specified render safe procedures unless they
    obtain written authorization from the 111th Ordnance Group 6D
    deviate based on the urgency of essential operations or the
    impracticalities of normal render safe methods.
    
          d.    Establish written safety procedures for the Doha
    clearance operation to include the following item at a minimum.
    
                     (1)    Mandate wear of the flak vast and helmet by all
    personnel at all times during any EOD operation.
    
                     (2)    Require the senior EOD technician on site to give
    daily safety briefings for all personnel involved in or around
    the site and to personnel who arrive during operations.
    
                                  5
    

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