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    5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)
    
          I spent the morning of the 23d of July, checking on the various
    -~.,clearing operations. I had essentially spent all of my time on-site since
     11 July fire helping to coordinate the clean up effort. I returned to
     my office around 1400 hours on the afternoon of 23 July to prepare for a
     briefing. While there, I heard a detonation. I started to inquire as to
     whether the shot was an EOD detonation.            came up on the radio
     net stating that an incident had occurred at the holding area. I.then
     proceeded with              to the site of the incident. I heard the EOD
     radio for MEDE AC and heard emergency vehicles being requested on the
     Regimental command net.
    
     When we arrived at the scene.           briefed us that there were three
     soldiers 'ead, two EOD and one Blackhorse.I then Aave the initial ca:rl Vcr
     thqt'RegiAntal Operations Center (ROO) based on               report and
     ad,ksed the Regimental S-3 of the incident. There was initially some
     conf * usiorrIat.,the accident site over which Blackhorse soldier was killed.
     We con~ructed roll call. deducted that~was missing and
     ascertained no one else was in3ured-I identified the dead body an that of
     who had TC'd the APC. I made a positive identification by a
     of the face and dog tags.
    
          I bad last seen           in the washracks area around 1345 hours. I
     checked with him to see how things were going and he reported everything
     was fine. The team was then working on loading 155mm projectiles tnto the
     A.railer.j-l 1 . ooked into the second                        parked trailer which containeo  smaller
     ordnanceA - It contained mortar fuses, band grenades, ADAM rounds and
 _.M42 DPICM mun-Tif-io-n-T-Eff-he driver was in the track.~we~e
     collecting up the ordnance. I did not notice anything unsafe or unusual'in
     the operation. All personnel were wearing their protective gear_3 some
     of the munitions in the 2d trailer were stored in cardboard boxes. The
     only thin S out of the ordinary was the larger than normal amount of
     ... unitions stored in the trailer but this was expected based on an earlier
     recon of the washrack area that identified a far greater contamination than
     previously encountered.
    
         ~~Was present in the washrack area as was                    They
     were part of the assistance team to help EOD. We were now utilizing APO'S
     to haul the trailers to the ammo pits. This was predicted on the greater
     number of flat-tires we had suffered transporting with the HbSW's. The
     APC's also gave better protection again.4t shrapnel in'the contaminated
     areas in case- of any accidental detonation of unexploded ordnance. The
     decision to use APO's was a joint one between the Regiment and the EOD.
    
     Whenever a Blackhorse contingent was utilized. the chain of command
     gave a safety briefing. When the emphasis changed to a smaller group, that
     is the mission was driven by EOD with only minimum assistance provided by
     the 11th ACR, then the issue of who was responsible for briefing these
     troops was not specifically discussed. However. it was my impression that
     ,he senior EOD personnel at each clearing site would brief the Blackhorse
     personnel. I had actually witnessed several of these briefings. The
     responsibility for giving safety briefings to the troops moving the ammo to
     the pit was never discussed. I was not aware of any written policy as to
     having a APC driver and TC remain mounted during ordnance clearing
    
    5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)2
    

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