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File: 123096_sep96_decls2_0006.txt
Subject: MEDICAL OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM 9 NOV 91
Unit: VAR. BUMED
Parent Organization: BUMED
Box ID: BX303801
Folder Title: VARIOUS BUMED DOCUMENTS FOLDER 6
Document Number: 2
Folder Seq #: 10
temporary additional duty orders. No authoritative orders were issued designating
them as commanding officer. The lack of acceptable evidence of command to estab-
hsh authority for con=itting fimds and ordering controlled medicinals caused
delays in obtaining supplies and services for FH-5.
Lastly, internal and external communications equipment supplied with the
deployable platforms was inadequate in quality and quantity. The hand-held radios
that came with the fleet hospitals were of insufficient power to communicate
necessary security and patient arrival information within the confines of the
compound. Eidsting radios for external communications had insufficient power and
the wrong antenna configuration to meet range requirements for effective command
and control and patient regulating, even before the outbreak of hostilities. In
addition, all forces should be made aware that secure communications by hospital
ships is prohibited during hostilities in order for them to receive protection under
the Geneva Convention.
G RFADINESS
Desert Shield convincingly demonstrated the Navy's ability to rapidly achieve a
significant medical capability in theater. In addition, the Navy achieved its initial
1,500-bed capability with Tninims;l demands for strategic lift. The Navy should
continue to maintain the hospital ships in ROS-5 and a fleet hospital prepositioned
afloat to ensure that this capability continues. In addition, the Navy should
consider the need for a second fleet hospital prepositioned afloat. Organic capa-
biuties of Navy hospitals, including messing, berthing, and transportation, were
essential to their ability to stand up quicldy. Similarly, the hospital ships arrived
ready to care for patients. Lessons learned to improve self-sufficiency in the crucial
early days before logistic and support :ftmctions are fully in place include main-
g initial class VM supplies at 60 days for fleet hospitals, increasing them to
30 days for the hospital ships, and providing dedicated, preferably organic, heh-
copter capability for the hospital ships.
G
Adequate priority, fimding, and commitment to providing requisite training to
support naval medicine's operational mission are essential for readiness. Many of
the personnel who arrived in theater had not received required general medical and
follow-on t g certification or operational g. This training requires
resources, time, and personnel and competes with peacetime goals to con-lain
C US costs and support graduate medical education. The prolonged period
-Vifi-
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Document 57 f:/Week-37/BX303801/VARIOUS BUMED DOCUMENTS FOLDER 6/medical operations during operation desert storm:1217961126393
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-37
Box ID = BX303801
Unit = VAR. BUMED
Parent Organization = BUMED
Folder Title = VARIOUS BUMED DOCUMENTS FOLDER 6
Folder Seq # = 10
Subject = MEDICAL OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996