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File: 123096_sep96_decls2_0017.txt
Subject: MEDICAL OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM 9 NOV 91
Unit: VAR. BUMED
Parent Organization: BUMED
Box ID: BX303801
Folder Title: VARIOUS BUMED DOCUMENTS FOLDER 6
Document Number: 2
Folder Seq #: 10
would probably be improved if the NAVCENT surgeon is at the same command level
as the other component surgeons. @y, the Navy component commanders
surgeon should be involved in operational planning. Collocating the surgeon with
the rest of the component cornmander's staff makes this easier. If the component
commander is located afloat, however, there may be valid reasons for locating the
surgeon ashore.
Inadequate staffing also hampered medical command and control. COMUS-
NAVCENT active-duty medical staffing at the onset of Desert Shield consisted of a
single medical planner augmented with a reservist. As the operation evolved, the
staff grew to include seven officers and eight enlisted personnel. Staffing in the
areas of medical logistics, intelligence, and planning, however, was inadequate. The
medical staff lacked experience, particularly in a unified command structure, and
specific expertise in medical supply and regulating in a joint operation. A require-
ment for enhanced training for plans, operations, and medical intelligence (PO@)
officers and detailing to appropriate operational bmets is indicated
Command and control within individual N=s could be strengthened by requir-
ing a screening board to select active-duty officers for command of fleet hospitals and
the MTF aboard hospital ships, just as SELRES are selected for command of Naval
Reserve fleet hospitals. Those selected should have had defined, requisite g
and experience. Commanding officers require official orders from the Chief of Na-.,al
Personnel to provide them vnth the proper authority and legal basis to exermse the
Active-duty captains were sent to FH-5 and the hospital
ship MTFs on temporary additional duty (TAD) orders. No authoritative orders were
issued designating them as commanding officer. The lack of acceptable evidence of
command to establish authority for committing hmds and p g controlled
medi@ caused delays in obtaining supplies and services for FH-5.
In addition, the internal and external communications equipment supplied with
the deployable platforms was inadequate, in both quality and quantity. The hand-
held radios that came with the fleet hospitals were of insufficient power to commu-
nicate necessary security and patient arrival information within the confines of the
compound. Existing radios for external communications had insufficient power and
the wrong antenna configuration to meet range requirements for effective command
and control and patient regulating, even before the outbreak of hostilities. Com-
milnir.qtions be,--Rme less reliable after 15 January. In addition, all forces should be
made aware that secure communications by hospital ships is prohibited during
hostilities in order for them to receive protection under the Geneva Convention.
Occasionally, lack of this knowledge hampered lwson with the hospital ships.
.8-
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Document 57 f:/Week-37/BX303801/VARIOUS BUMED DOCUMENTS FOLDER 6/medical operations during operation desert storm:1217961126393
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-37
Box ID = BX303801
Unit = VAR. BUMED
Parent Organization = BUMED
Folder Title = VARIOUS BUMED DOCUMENTS FOLDER 6
Folder Seq # = 10
Subject = MEDICAL OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996