UNITED STATES NAVY IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

interoperability issues - comms, tactics, limitations.1, from seven LHA/LPHs in a Very narrow sea echelon area.

- Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn- - Rear Admiral J. B. LaFlante, USN, CIF
mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn- 156, "Quick Look" Report, 11 March1991
rnand, Quick Look - First Impressions
Report, 22 March1991 TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT. Over 99%

We must continue emphasis on of the Naval Reservists called to duty in sup-
port of DESERT SHIELD responded to that
people programs which are the foun- call. They augmented the active force with the
dation of the all-volunteer force. mix of skills required to get the job done.
High retention and the experience Reserves had major roles in cargo handling,
level of our forces contributed to medical support, combat construction and con-
victory. trol of shipping. Uke their active duty coun-

"The qualityofour personnel deployed in theater set terparts, they proved~ to be well-trained and
new standards of excellence. I cannot say enough about the highly professional. While some specific func-
peiformance of our people. The speed of their advance on the tional areas and administrative matters re-
battl~eld, their expert employment of weapons systems, quiring additional emphasis were noted,
exceptionally low UCMJ violation rate, and their strong DESERT SHIELDiSTORM clearly validated
positive showing on media eVents all support the sennces significant aspects of the Navy's total force
quality force pro grams... The credit for this goes to the troops concept.
and their commanders. The all volunteer force is a winner."

- General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, * Over the past decade, the United
Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Corn- States has invested heavily in Naval
mand, Preliminary Report on Lessons Reserve manpower, training, and
Learned, 5 April 1991 equipment. This investment really

High quality, realistic training is paid off in DESERT SHIELD/
STORM:
difficult, time consuming and expen-
sive, but it is fundamental to success - Seabees: about 2/3 of all Seabees
in combat. As our force gets smaller, were reservists.
we will focus continued attention and
resources on training. Just one of - Mine countermeasures: the Naval
many examples of the superb level of Reserve provided more than half
training readiness enjoyed by our of the total dedicated MCM per-
forces from the outset was provided sonnel.
by the amphibious force:
- Combat Search and Rescue: all of
"There was no pre-deployment work-up, yet four of the Navy's dedicated Combat
the five largest amphibious operations since INCHON (num-
ber one was STEEL PIKE in 1964) were execu ted flawlessly Search and Rescue personnel are
and without injury or damage. The training was realistic - reservists.
and at times dangerous (but never unsafe): in jull EM CON,
darkened, at night the ATF executed simultaneous launch of - Cargo Handling Battalions: all of
50 AA Vs, simultaneous landing of 12 LCAC, and air assault the so-called "combat stevedores"

- 55 -