-   DEFENSE SUPPRESSION. The                                     "DESERT STORM demonstrated the necessity for
           ol~tstanding performance of the                       precision guided munitions. Laser guided bombs (and their
           E A-613, other Navy defense sup-                      advanced successors such as inertially aided munitions),
                     aircraft and weapon                         SLAM, and TLAM have all proven their worth, both militar-
           pres Si On                                            ily and politically. We need- to maintain the technologicatedge
           systems was a noteworthy                              these weapons give, both through continued research and
           strength in high demand for strike                    development, preplanned product improvement (P31), and in
           support of all services and coali-                    maintenance of sufficient munitions in our arsenal to cope
           tion forces during the campaign.                      with likely future contingencies."
                                                                        -  Admiral J. T. Howe, USN, Commander-
           Their performance was instru-                                   in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Quick
           rrtental in the early achievement                               Look First Impressions Report, 20 March
           of air superiority.                                             1991

       "Suppression ofenemyairdefenses (SEAD) was one                   "The 2000 pound penetrator is the weapon you need
of the Navy's noteworthy strengths. The EA-6B performed          to kill the really hard, important, war-winning targets."
ve~ well and w~ the clear choice. USN HARM (high-speed
anti--radiation missile) and jam doctrine was successful..."            -  Rear Admiral R.D. Mixson, USN, Com-
                                                                           mander Battle Force YANKEE (Red Sea),
       -   Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Com-                             during OPNAV debrief, 18 April 1991
           mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Com-
           mand, Quick Look - First Impressions                         -  TACTICAL RECONNAIS-
           Report, 22 March1991                                            SAN CE. The importance of real-

       -   S1~ART WEAPONS. Although                                        time and near-real-time tactical
           not all weapons were used in                                    reconnaissance in support of
           sufficient numbers to draw defini-                              strike planning, naval gunfire
           tive conclusions (the standoff land                             support (NGFS), and battle dam-
                                                                           age assessment (BDA) was clearly
           attack missile (SLAM) for ex-                                   demonstrated during DESERT
           ample), "smart" or precision
           weapons clearly demonstrated                                    STORM. Navy platforms such as
           their capabilities against point                                the tactical air reconnaissance pod
           targets and we will be procuring                                system (TARPS) equipped F-14
           more of them. We also reaffirmed                                and unmanned aerial vehides
                                                                           (UAVs) performed as designed,
           a requirement for highly accurate                               but could not meet the demand.
           p(?netrating weapons for use
           against heavily bunkered or                                  -  AIRBORNE TANKING. Geogra-
           h~.:~rdened structures.                                         phy dictated extensive land-based

       "laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) were consumed at a                       tanking support for both USAF
much greater rate than an ticipa ted in pre-hostilities plan-              and naval air strikes into Iraq.
ninS. LGBs quickly became the weapon ofchoicefor a variety                 Tanker coordination went ex-
of missions against relatively low-value, non-hardened tar-                tremely well. But tankers were
gets. MK-83 LOBs were particularly us~l..."                                stretched thin, and their appor-

                                                                           tionment necessarily limited the
       -   Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn-                            Navy's long-range strike contribu-
           mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn-                          tion.
           mand, Quick Look - First Impressions
           Report, 22 March1991


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