*  SURFACE WARFARE. DESERT                                          Amphibious operations focused
      STORM demonstrated the enduring                                  enemy attention on the threat from
      value of long range naval gunfire                                seaward and tied down at least seven
      support. Unmanned aerial vehicles                                Thaqi divisions, even after the coalition
      (UAVs) were effective in target                                  ground campaign was well under-
      selection, spotting the fall of shot and                         way. The responsiveness and flexibil-
      damage assessment. We are actively                               ity of amphibious forces was high-
      looking for alternative long range                               lighted by successful raids, rehearsals
      naval fire support systems to replace                            and feints. The large deck amphibi-
      the battleships in future conflicts.                             ous assault ship (LHA) proved its
      The firepower of surface action                                  versatility, operating significantly
      groups was augmented with attack                                 more AV-8s than planned (20 vice 6)
      helicopters (U.S. Army AHIPs and                                 while serving as flagship and con-
      Royal Navy Lynx). The combination                                ducting the full~spectrum of other
      of the attack helos working in con-                              amphibious operations.
      junction with SH-60B (LAMPS Mk
      III) and surface combatants provided                          *  MINE WARFARE. DESERT STORM
      a highly effective enhancement to                                again illustrated the challenge of mine
      surface warfare offensive / reconnais-                           countermeasures (MCM) and how
      sance capability. Naval forces used                              quickly mines can become a concern.
      the offensive firepower of strike                                Because of the difficulty of locating
      aircraft (A-6s and F/A-18s) and                                  and neutralizing mines, we cannot
      surface combatants to destroy the                                afford to give the minelayer free rein.
      Iraqi navy. At last count, 105 Iraqi                             Future rules of engagement and
      vessels had been destroyed.                                      doctrine should provide for offensive
                                                                       operations to prevent the laying of
      "...Ship/aircrafi [helicopter) su?face action groups             mines in international waters. Our
(SAGS) proved to be indispensable in achieving ASUW                    Cold War focus on the Soviet threat
offensive/RE CCE coverage.
      "Maritime patrol aircraft CM PA) played a major                  fostered reliance on our overseas
role in the AS UW success. P-3/NIMROD availability and                 allies for mine countermeasures in
reliability were outstanding, as was the quality of the sur            forward areas. The MCM assets of
veillance and targeting provided from the beginning of                 our allies - on whom we have relied
maritime interception force operations to the present, includ-         for MCM support in NATO contin-
ing DESERT STORM. P3C with and without ISAR... were                    gencies for years - proved their
fully integrated with battle force operations."                        mettle in the Gulf, both in Operation

      -  Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn-                          EARNEST WILL (during the Iran-Iraq
         mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn-                        war) and DESERT STORM. Both
         mand, Quick Look - First Impress ions                         operations highlighted the need for a
         Report, 22 March1991                                          robust, deployable U.S. Navy MCM

      AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE. The                                          capability. We are undertaking a
                                                                       comprehensive review of both our
      entire spectrum of amphibious cap a-                             mine countermeasures strategy and
      bility and force structure was used                              the readiness of our forces to ensure
      during DESERT SHIELD/STORM.                                      our ability to conduct independent


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