End Notes

[1] Tab A lists acronyms, abbreviations, and glossary terms.

[2] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "Iraqi Air Force Capability to Deliver Chemical Weapons," December 1, 1990; US Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," February 13, 1998.

[3] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "Iraqi Air Force Capability to Deliver Chemical Weapons," December 1, 1990.

[4] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas," December 28, 1990.

[5] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "Desert Storm Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Facilities," January 28, 1991. The DIA believed Iraq used refrigerated bunkers, which tended to have 12 points or frames, to store biological warfare agents.

[6] Robert D Walpole, Special Assistant to the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, "17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message. A Statement for the Record," Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, July 29-30, 1997, p. 10. "S-shaped bunkers served as the primary factor for analysts in their identification of suspect chemical weapons storage sites before the war. The IC [intelligence community] had assessed-for logical, analytical reasons-that S-shaped bunkers were the most likely storage sites for forward-deployed Iraqi chemical weapons. In the years following the war, however, it became clear that S-shaped bunkers were not a reliable signature for the presence of chemical munitions; in many cases the Iraqis had hidden munitions outside bunkers to protect them from Coalition airstrikes." Persian Gulf Illnesses Task Force, "Lessons Learned: Intelligence Support on Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Gulf War and on Veterans' Illnesses Issues," December 1997, p. 8.

[7] The chemical warfare agent production facility near Samarra was also known in Iraq as Al Muthanna. According to Iraq's UN declarations, the 155mm mustard (HD) shells stored in Bunker Eight at the An Nasiriyah SW ASP from January to February 1991 were transferred from this facility to an open storage area 5 kilometers west of the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Point. Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para 4B.

[8] Memorandum from VP Task Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, Subject: "Iraqi Biological Warfare Capabilities," [undated], p. 1-2. The most recent information on Iraq's biological warfare program and UN declarations appears in US Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," February 13, 1998, Appendix A. The glossary contains additional information on biological agents.

[9] Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, "17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message. A Statement for the Record," Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, July 29-30, 1997, p. 10.

[10] For more information on this office's investigation of Tallil Air Base, please see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Tallil Air Base, Iraq" (Case Narrative), May 25, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/tallil_ii/.

[11] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para. 4C and 4F.

[12] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para 4C.

[13] 505th Parachute Infantry Regimental history, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, p. K-5.

[14] Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, June 17, 1996.

[15] Headquarters, 82nd Engineer Battalion document, Subject: "Operation Desert Shield/Storm (History of 82nd Engineer Battalion)," May 16, 1992.

[16] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para 4F.

[17] For more information on the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.

[18] 82nd Airborne Division, Message, No subject given, March 23, 1991; Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, June 17, 1996.

[19] To avoid confusing the reader, "The Search for Chemical Weapons" and "The Search for Biological Weapons" separately describe activities that in many cases occurred simultaneously. This is especially true in "The Search for Biological Weapons," since demolition-related activities started almost as soon as the 82nd Airborne occupied the ASP on March 1, 1991, while the helicopter-inserted biological warfare agent sampling mission, which is the focus of that section, did not occur until March 6, 1991.

[20] A description of UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator) grid coordinate can be found in the glossary.

[21] 82nd Airborne Division, Message, No subject given, March 23, 1991.

[22] Lead Sheet 7947, Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, April 21, 1997; Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, June 17, 1996.

[23] A munition's signature is the distinctive illumination mark and/or characteristic sound effect indicating its identity.

[24] Lead Sheet 7947, Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, April 21, 1997; Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer interview notes, June 17, 1996.

[25] Interview of 82nd Airborne Division, brigade level chemical officer is documented in Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, May 6, 1997, p. 9-29.

[26] Lead Sheet 10168, Interview of Fox vehicle operator, May 15, 1997; Lead Sheet 13189, Interview of Fox vehicle commander, October 21, 1997; and Lead Sheet 17555, Interview of Fox vehicle crew chief, October 4, 1999. Note: Only two Fox vehicles were assigned to and conducted chemical warfare agent survey operations in the Tallil AB/An Nasiriyah ASP area. Since these veterans were assigned to two different Fox vehicles, they would have been aware of any positive samples this system took.

[27] Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear protects soldiers against chemical and biological agents. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

[28] Lead Sheet 12002, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion S-2 intelligence officer, September 15, 1997.

[29]For more information about the M256 series chemical agent detector kit, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

[30] Lead Sheet 10168, Interview of Fox vehicle operator, May 15, 1997.

[31] XVIII Airborne Corps message, Subject: "Chem Munition Marking Colors," February 28, 1991.

[32] See also, Persian Gulf Illnesses Task Force, "Lessons Learned: Intelligence Support on Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Gulf War and on Veterans' Illnesses Issues," December 1997,p. 3-4.

[33] Lead Sheet 10787, Interview of 1703rd EOD Detachment member, May 27, 1997.

[34] Lead Sheet 11036, Interview of senior 60th EOD Detachment technician, May 23, 1997.

[35] Lead Sheet 11875, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, B Company, 1st Platoon engineer, June 13, 1997.

[36] Lead Sheet 11325, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company engineer, June 11, 1997.

[37] Transcript of Interview of 60th EOD Detachment technician, April 10, 1997, p. 19-23.

[38] Lead Sheet 11036, Interview of senior 60th EOD Detachment technician, May 23, 1997.

[39] 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," April 1, 1991. This journal refers to discovering a single chemical bomb, Item 60-76-DS, at coordinates several kilometers east of the An Nasiriyah SW ASP on March 7, 1991. The journal indicates the Fox vehicles detected no chemical agents in the munitions or the area at those coordinates. See Figure 6 for the munitions' position. Lead Sheet 27636, Interview with senior scientist, Battelle, August 31, 2000.

[40] The Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents requested an evaluation of the warhead fragment photographs in Figures 7A and 7B. In May -June 2000, five discrete explosive ordnance disposal technical organizations did so. The evaluations produced equivocal results and ranged from " ... most likely a high explosive type munition." to unidentifiable. The images' lack of scale precludes positive identification. Lead Sheet 26854, Telephone conversation and e-mail exchange with operations officer, 52nd Ordnance Group (EOD), May 18, 2000, p. 1-3; Lead Sheet 27064, Interview with first sergeant, 741st Ordnance Company (EOD), June 12, 2000, p. 1; Lead Sheet 26772, Meeting with incumbent and incoming company commanders, first sergeant, and operations sergeant, 767th Ordnance Company (EOD), May 23, 2000, p. 1-2; Lead Sheet 26933, Interview with chemical weapons specialist, National Ground Intelligence Center, May 25, 2000, p. 1; Lead Sheet 26934, Interview with ground munitions technologist, Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center, June 5, 2000, p. 1.

[41] Both photos reprinted with permission of the senior 60th EOD Detachment technician who spotted the munition and filed the 60th EOD Detachment report.

[42] The location of the warehouse very well could have been on the access road between Tallil and the ASP, which contained a warehouse complex with large quantities of captured equipment and weapons removed from Kuwait. Lead Sheet 12100, Interview of 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment member, July 14, 1997; and Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Tallil Air Base, Iraq," (Case Narrative Final Report), May 22, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/tallil_ii/.

[43] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Chapter 7, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999); US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, CAS 2698-41-1, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1994.

[44] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Chapter 2, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999).

[45] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Chapter 7, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999).

[46] Lead Sheet 12100, Interview of 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment member, July 14, 1997.

[47] To avoid confusing the reader, "The Search for Chemical Weapons" and "The Search for Biological Weapons" sections of this narrative separately describe activities that in many cases occurred simultaneously, especially for biological weapons, since demolition activities started almost as soon as the ASP was occupied on March 1, 1991, while the helicopter-inserted biological warfare agent sampling mission, the focus of this section, did not occur until March 6, 1991.

[48] Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, Message, Subject: "XM2/PM10 (BGI) Biological Aerosol Sampler in Desert Storm," March 13, 1991.

[49] Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center, "Historical Report Operation Desert Storm," March 20, 1991, [unnumbered]. In addition, we will soon publish a "Biological Warfare Investigation" Closeout Report, which will provide additional details on the 9th Chemical Detachment and its detection equipment.

[50] Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center, "Historical Report Operation Desert Storm," March 20, 1991, [unnumbered].

[51] US Army Central Command, Message, Subject: "513th Military Intelligence Brigade Task Force to Kuwait City Restoration - Situation Report," March 7, 1991, para. 1A.

[52] Lead Sheet 7938, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission pilot, April 15, 1997; Lead Sheet 7945, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission co-pilot, April 17, 1997; Lead Sheet 9507, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission crew chief, February 14, 1997, Lead Sheet 9522, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission door gunner, May 13, 1997.

[53] Lead Sheet 7938, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission pilot, April 15, 1997. In his interview the door gunner mentions he showed his photos of their landing site to two analysts, one from the Presidential Advisory Committee and the other from a Senate staff, and both "confirmed" that the photos were from Khamisiyah, which also had the same type of munition storage bunkers. Lead Sheet 9522, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission door gunner, May 13, 1997. This March 6, 1991, sampling mission to An Nasiriyah took place only 2 days after the very large, 36-bunker demolition on March 4, 1991at the Khamisiyah ASP, approximately 25 kilometers to the south.

[54] In declaring its chemical warfare agent locations to UNSCOM inspectors, Iraq said the site was near "Khamisiyah (An Nasiriyah)." The inspectors believed they were going to visit the An Nasiriyah SW ASP site (next to Tallil) and were surprised when they were taken to a site then known to the US as Tall al Lahm (Khamisiyah), about 25 kilometers farther to the south. This confusion occurred because in 1990-91, the intelligence community associated chemical and biological weapons storage with specific bunker types. Since the An Nasiriyah SW ASP contained one S-shaped, chemical weapons-associated bunker and four 12-frame biological weapons-associated storage bunkers, and because the Khamisiyah ASP was not thought to contain either type, the intelligence community initially believed Iraq's UN declarations were deceptive. UNSCOM inspectors later confirmed during Khamisiyah ASP inspections the presence of 155mm mustard-filled artillery shells (which Iraq said originally were stored at the An Nasiriyah SW ASP) and 122mm artillery rockets with sarin-filled warheads. For more background on this subject, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0099 92/Chemical Rocket Destruction in Khamisiyah," June 1992; Central Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "Working Paper Mentioning Possible CW Exposure," 1992; and Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0020 92/UNSCOM 20 (CW 6) Inspection Results of Kamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility," November 12, 1991.

[55] Lead Sheet 7945, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission co-pilot, April 17, 1997.

[56] Lead Sheet 7945, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission co-pilot, April 17, 1997.

[57] Lead Sheet 7938, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission pilot, April 15, 1997; Lead Sheet 9522, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission door gunner, May 13, 1997.

[58] Lead Sheet 7945, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission co-pilot, April 17, 1997.

[59] Hafemeister, Rod, "Gulf War Veteran Details his Illness," News-Democrat, Belleville, Illinois, July 23, 1995, p. 1; Lead Sheet 9507, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission crew chief, February 14, 1997. Other News-Democrat articles on this mission include "Chemical Weapons Found Before Blast," July 1, 1996, and "Reservists Questioned About Weapons," October 1, 1996.

[60] Lead Sheet 9522, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission door gunner, May 13, 1997.

[61] Photos in Figures 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D reprinted with the permission of the Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission pilot.

[62] Lead Sheet 7834, Interview of 513th Military Intelligence Brigade chemical officer, December 3, 1997.

[63] Lead Sheet 15388, Interview of Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center medical intelligence officer, March 9, 1998.

[64] Lead Sheet 13573, Interview of 9th Chemical Company biological warfare agent senior enlisted sample team member, December 1, 1997.

[65] Lead Sheet 9522, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission door gunner, May 13, 1997; Lead Sheet 7834, Interview of 513th Military Intelligence Brigade chemical officer, December 3, 1997; and Lead Sheet 15388, Interview of Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center medical intelligence officer, March 9, 1998.

[66] Lead Sheet 7949, Interview of Headquarters and Headquarters Company/307th Engineer Battalion S-3 operations officer, April 17, 1997.

[67] Interviews with 60th EOD Detachment and 307th Engineer Battalion personnel reveal they did not wear MOPP gear during their activities at Tallil and the ASP since 82nd Airborne chemical personnel had searched and cleared it. Lead Sheet 6498, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion commander, May 7, 1997; Lead Sheet 12002, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion S-2 intelligence officer, September 15, 1997; and Lead Sheet 12100, Interview of 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment member, July 14, 1997.

[68] Lead Sheet 7949, Interview of Headquarters and Headquarters Company/307th Engineer Battalion S-3 operations officer , April 17, 1997.

[69] Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center, "Historical Report Operation Desert Storm," March 20, 1991, [unnumbered].

[70] US Army Central Command, Message, Subject: "513th Military Intelligence Brigade Task Force to Kuwait City Restoration - Situation Report," March 7, 1991; Lead Sheet 13654, Interview of JCMEC commander, December 16, 1997.

[71] Lead Sheet 14102 (previously 13833), Interview of JCMEC operations officer, January 9, 1998. The JCMEC operations officer noted the samples were to be sent to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, located at Fort Detrick, Maryland. However, investigators are confident the samples were sent to and tested at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), also located at Fort Detrick, where all samples were tested for biological warfare agent presence. USAMRIID web site www.usamriid.army.mil/ (as of December 3, 1999).

[72] US Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases, Special Pathogens Section, Department of Epidemiology, Disease Assessment Division Specimen Report, March 27, 1992. The tests identified several substances, including 2, 4, 6 trinitrotoluene (TNT, an explosive filler used in conventional munitions), water (with environmental contaminants including common bacteria and various minerals). USAMRIID tested the three soil samples for anthrax, with negative results.

[73] Lead Sheet 14159, Interview of the chief, Special Pathogens Branch, USAMRIID, April 7, 1998.

[74] 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," Item 60-70-DS, April 1, 1991.

[75] Lead Sheet 7947, Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, April 21, 1997; Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, June 17, 1996.

[76] Cook off: military jargon meaning to detonate or set off as a result of overheating.

[77] Lead Sheet 9522, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission door gunner, May 13, 1997; Lead Sheet 7945, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission co-pilot, April 17, 1997; Lead Sheet 9507, Interview of Black Hawk biological warfare agent sampling mission crew chief,

[78] Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Maryland, Letter, January 27, 1998, para. 1.a. This letter contains a consensus of EOD community and intelligence input from the National Ground Intelligence Center and the US Army's Picatinny Arsenal.

[79] Lead Sheet 11833, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion engineer, November 4, 1997.

[80] Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Maryland, Letter, January 27, 1998.

[81] 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," Item 60-70-DS, April 1, 1991.

[82] Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Maryland, Letter, January 27, 1998, para 1.a.

[83] Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Maryland, Letter, January 27, 1998, para 1.b.

[84] Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Maryland, Letter, January 27, 1998, para 1.e.

[85] 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," Item 60-70-DS, April 1, 1991.

[86] Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Maryland, Letter, January 27, 1998, para. 1.e. and 1.f.

[87] B Company, 307th Engineer Battalion engineers also participated in demolitions at Tallil and the An Nasiriyah SW ASP. Lead Sheet 1079, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company, platoon leader, October 23, 1996; Transcript of Interview of 60th EOD Detachment technician, April 10, 1997, p. 4; Lead Sheet 6498, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion commander, May 7, 1997.

[88] Lead Sheet 1079, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company, platoon leader, October 23, 1996; Lead Sheet 9918, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company, a 2nd platoon leader, April 29, 1997; Lead Sheet 7948, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company, a 3rd platoon leader, April 17, 1997; Lead Sheet 1080, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion executive officer, December 18, 1996; Lead Sheet 12002, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion S-2 intelligence officer, September 15, 1997; and Lead Sheet 6498, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion S-2 intelligence officer, May 7, 1997.

[89] Lead Sheet 11875, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, B Company, 1st Platoon engineer, June 13, 1997; Interview of 60th EOD Detachment technician, April 10, 1997, p. 4; and Lead Sheet 1080, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion executive officer, December 18, 1996.

[90] Lead Sheet 11249, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company, platoon leader, December 18, 1997; Lead Sheet 1079, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company, platoon leader, October 23, 1996; Lead Sheet 9918, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion, C Company, a 2nd platoon leader, April 29, 1997; Lead Sheet 1080, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion executive officer, December 18, 1996; Lead Sheet 12002, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion S-2 intelligence officer, September 15, 1997; and Lead Sheet 6498, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion commander, May 7, 1997.

[91] Lead Sheet 6498, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion commander, May 7, 1997.

[92] Lead Sheet 10168, Interview of Fox vehicle operator, May 15, 1997; Lead Sheet 13189, Interview of Fox vehicle commander, October 21, 1997; and Lead Sheet 17555, Interview of Fox vehicle crew chief, October 4, 1999. Note: Only two Fox vehicles were assigned to survey chemical warfare agents in the Tallil/ASP area. Since these persons were assigned to two different Fox vehicles, they would have been aware of any positive samples this system took.

[93] The best illustration of this occurred when the two 60th EOD Detachment technicians discovered a possible chemical warfare agent-filled munition near the storage point. They immediately left the area (instead of using an M256 kit) and reported the sighting. Fox vehicles responded to their report, testing the area with negative results. Interview of 60th EOD Detachment technician, April 10, 1997, p. 21-23; Lead Sheet 11036, Interview of senior 60th EOD Detachment technician, May 23, 1997; 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," Item 60-76-DS, April 1, 1991.

[94] Lead Sheet 6498, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion commander, May 7, 1997.

[95] 82nd Airborne Division, Message, Subject: "307th Engr Bn Operations Summary," March 23, 1991, p. 1-5. Note: This summary does not include aircraft destroyed by US Air Force munitions or other units.

[96] Photo reprinted with the permission of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment deputy commander.

[97] Lead Sheet 10775, Interview of 1703rd EOD Detachment member, May 6, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet 10358, Interview of 1703rd EOD Detachment member, March 3, 1997, p. 2-3; Lead Sheet 11043, Interview of 1703rd EOD Detachment team leader, May 29, 1997, p. 2-4; Lead Sheet 10789, Interview of 1703rd EOD Detachment member, May 14, 1997, p. 1.

[98] 505th Parachute Infantry Regimental History, Operation Desert Shield/Storm; Headquarters, 82nd Engineer Battalion document, Subject: "Operation Desert Shield/Storm (History of 82nd Engineer Battalion)," May 16, 1992, K-3.

[99] Headquarters, 82nd Engineer Battalion document, Subject: "Operation Desert Shield/Storm (History of 82nd Engineer Battalion)," May 16, 1992, p. 2.

[100] 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "146th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Shield)," May 15, 1991.

[101] Lead Sheet 10523, Interview of 146th EOD Detachment commander, June 3, 1997; Lead Sheet 895, Interview of 146th EOD Detachment commander, August 13, 1996.

[102] The "controversy" concerning this specific demolition was due to its size, visibility, and lack of warning to nearby units. The lack
of warning was primarily due to the demolition being repeatedly delayed for several hours from late afternoon to early evening due to
ASP safety clearance concerns. (Iraqi nationals were grazing their sheep in the ASP - see the 84th Engineer Company commander
comments in Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, May 6, 1997, p. 131-134.)
The repeated warnings and subsequent delays evidently caused the actual demolition time not to be taken seriously - hence the surprise.
The dates, times, and locations of munition demolitions for both Tallil Air Base and the An Nasiriyah SW ASP are listed in the 60th and
146th EOD Detachment Incident Journals; 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm),"
Item 60-70-DS, April 1, 1991; 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "146th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Shield)," May 15,
1991. Both installations were located in the "PV" grid zone, with multiple bunker locations being listed under a single UTM coordinate. A
description of UTM can be found in the glossary.

[103] Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, May 6, 1997, p. 133-134.

[104] 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "146th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Shield)," May 15, 1991, Activity items 146-073-DS and 146-74-DS.

[105] Headquarters, 82nd Engineer Battalion, "Operation Desert Shield/Storm (History of 82nd Engineer Battalion)," May 16, 1992; Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, May 6, 1997, p. 131-135.

[106] See the 84th Engineer Company commander's comments in Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, May 6, 1997, p. 131-135.

[107] 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "146th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Shield)," May 15, 1991, Activity items 146-073-DS and 146-74-DS.

[108] Headquarters, 82nd Engineer Battalion, Subject: "Operation Desert Shield/Storm (History of 82nd Engineer Battalion)," May 16, 1992.

[109] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites ," May 1996, para. 4.

[110] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para 4B.

[111] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para 4G.

[112] Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para 4C.

[113] Mustard, unlike sarin which evaporates rapidly, is a persistent agent. If the bunker containing the mustard rounds (bunker 8) had been hit during the air campaign, US troops likely would have detected agent presence during their activities at this ASP. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Chapter 4-6 (b), web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 25, 1999).

[114] Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96/Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah chemical warfare related sites," May 1996, para 4B.

[115] Lead Sheet 11036, Interview of senior 60th EOD Detachment technician, May 23, 1997; 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," Item 60-76-DS, April 1, 1991.

[116] Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Maryland letter dated January 27, 1998.

[117] The sensitivity of biological agents to high temperatures, sunlight, etc., varies according to the specific agent; a listing of some biological agents and their environmental sensitivities is available in the glossary.

[118] In 1990, the US intelligence community assessed that Iraq possessed the biological warfare agents botulinum toxin, Bacillus anthracis, and Clostridium perfringens, which cause botulism, anthrax, and gas gangrene respectively. Additionally, they believed that Iraq had the technical capability to produce and weaponize several other biological agents, including the plague. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence, Message, Subject: "Information on Iraq's Biological Warfare Program," November 12, 1993.

[119] Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Fredrick, Maryland, Third Edition, July, 1998, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/medman/Handbook.htm (as of October 8, 1999); Anthrax web site www.anthrax.osd.mil/oldavip/anth.htm (as of October 8, 1999).

[120] Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Fredrick, Maryland, Third Edition, July, 1998, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/medman/Handbook.htm (as of October 8, 1999).

[121] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999).

[122] US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.

[123] US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," February 21, 1996, p. 1-13, 1-14.

[124] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999).

[125] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 3, p. 57.

[126] Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents, p. 4, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of October 12, 1999).

[127] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 31.

[128] Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, p. 162, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of September 2, 1999).

[129] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper),

[130] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.

[131] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.

[132] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual No 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, p. 17-18; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999).

[133] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 31.

[134] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 30.

[135] US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.

[136] United States Marine Corps Fact File web site www.hqmc.usmc.mil/factfile.nsf/7e931335d515626a8525628100676e0c/deef19f7262589df8525627a0052894a?OpenDocument (as of November 29, 1999).

[137] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

[138] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 412.

[139] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

[140] US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corp Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," February 21, 1996, chapter 2, p. 4.

[141] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 2, 8-9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/ (as of October 14, 1999).

[142] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999).

[143] Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center, "Historical Report Operation Desert Storm," March 20, 1991, [unnumbered].

[145] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I (as of October 8, 1999).

[146] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.

[147] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.

[148] UN Security Council Resolution 687, dated April 1991.

[149] Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, p. 471, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/u/06599.html (as of November 4, 1999).

[150] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of October 8, 1999).

[151] Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center, "Historical Report Operation Desert Storm," March 20, 1991, [unnumbered].

[152] Units listed were within 5 kilometers of the center of the An Nasiriyah SW ASP; entire units or only some individuals from the unit may have been in the vicinity.

[153] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 states and ratified or acceded by 106 states as of February 1998. It was signed by the United States on January 13, 1993, and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.

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