NBC OVERVIEW

File: 980420_sep96_decls1_0018.txt
Page: 0018
Total Pages: 43







                evening) and delivered the S-3 Situational Report to the Corps
                Message Center.

                     c. With the established intel support, battlebooks were
                assembled and the initial reference book provided to the Bnls
                prior to deployment was updated. The focus of the battlebooks
                were based on the commander's PIR's (TBM, chemical, and air
                threat).

                     d. S-2 operations included an update to the commander in the
                morning and an update of the current intel situation at an evening
                staff meeting.

                     e. other intel products produced to support ADA Operations
                included an Air IPB Matrix that supported the theater. The Air IPB
                Matrix was validated by CENTAF Air Analysis Cell and the XVIII
                Airborne Corps Air Analysis Section. Daily/weekly updates were
                on the TBM fixed and mobile sites, chemical facilities, and
                airfield locations. Other updates included order of battles on
                air, ground, and TBM'S.

                     f. A major challenge during this phase was map support. The
                high demand and short supply of maps took 3-4 months of continual
                requests. The maps in the 1:100,000, 1:500,000, and 1:250,000
                scales were acquired faster than the much needed 1:50,000 scale.
                Prior to the offensive compaign, the majority of the maps had been
                provided through XVIII Airborne Corps from deployed Defense
                Mapping Agency (DMA) personnel.
                     g. The unique S-2 operations in tracking the Iraq TBM mobile
                threat was tested when Iraq began launching Scud missiles against
                Saudi Arabia and Israel. The information was received, plotted,
                and quickly analyzed within seconds of launch notification.

                     h. The worse case threat scenario was used throughout the
                operation to ensure the S-2 was prepared for any situation.

                     i. The S-2 transitioned operations from the Bde Forward
                element to the Bde TAC. Prior planning and requirement for moving
                of two intel sections within country was another major challenge.
                The S-2 had a 2 man forward intel cell at Dhahran that was
                responsible for disseminating the INTSUM's received from Bdo TAC
                to the Bns located in the rear areas (2-7, and 3-43 ADA Bns).
                This section/slice was also responsible for keeping the forward
                Bde element Commander informed on the current intel situation.

                     3. The main body of the S-2 moved to KKMC with the Bde TAC.
                This move required establishing all the intel support and feed
                from higher headquarters. The cycle was repeated and with the Bde
                comm. system in place, the timeliness of Intel reports improved.
                The key to the timeliness of the intel was based on the colocation
                of the BDE TAC with the Air Force CRC at KKMC.

                          k. During the air campaign and ground offensive, the S-



                                             11-B-147
Box ID = BX000533
Folder Title = 11TH AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BDE DESERT SHIELD STORM AAR VOL 1                                    
Unit = ARCENT      
Parent = CENTCOM     
Subject = NBC OVERVIEW