AR 15-6 Investigation, ordnance Explosion, Doha,

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    5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)
    
    munitions, the responsibility for briefing Ilth ACR participants
    was unclear because individual units no longer had primary
    responsibility for a particular area each day.
    
         h.  The NCO followinilitihie  t                -1 ,    he
    deceased track commande.       ir"aier              and t
                              rl , had received an
    operational briefincr on 23 July, but had not received a safety
    briefing.            did not give              a safety briefing
    when he Assiqned    to be the tracK commander.          Further, he
    selected         as the track commander just before the APC
    departed tor th     posal pit. Early in the day,                 wa
    reminded by         to wear his protective gear.
    
            i.    The EOD team had been working continuously since 11 Jul
    1991~t although individual team members had been given a day off.
    Theft work required intense concentration while wearing helmets
    and flak vests in 100-110 degree heat under direct sunlight for
    houriCae a time. They were experiencing frustration, fatigue an
    boredom with the task, and the most difficult part of the
    job--clearing the area in the immediate vicinity of the 11 July
    explosion-still lay ahead.
    
                     (1)     To reduce stress and fatigue the team had already
    reduced the work period to eight hours per day, increased break
    time.during the day, and planned for a team stand-down on 24,
    July.
    
              (2)  On 22 July                  the acting detachment
    commander, verbally requested augmentation from 111th ordnance
    Group to assist in clean-up of the areas of heaviest ordnance
    contamination. The 111th ordnance Group forwarded a written
    request for this assistance to Headquarters, 22d SUPCOM, which
    received the request on 23 July.
    
                     (3)     Despite the tedium of the task, the EOD team
    members, without exception, did not feel compelled to do anythin
    unsafe. Their mutual work ethic provided ample opportunity to
    question each other's methods and technical approaches to the
    task. No evidence points to unsafe acts as a result of fatigue.
    
                     (4)     Several personnel in the detachment chose not to
    follow safety procedures regarding wear of the flak vest and
    helmet when in the disposal pit area, including
    
    protective gear on occasion.
    
              (5)  The acting commander,                  knew, but
    abandoned the correct procedures to render unarme     M42
    submunitions safe for movement and destruction. See Exhibit 45.
    The 1SG,               did not know the proper procedures for
    rendering the unarmed M42 submunitions safe.
    
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                             5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)