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File: 0000004.txt
5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)
(6) The magnitude of the task and the desire to
finish rapidly led a few team members to accept more risk in
their procedures. In some cases, they ignored standing orders c
established guidelines so they could expedite handling the
munitions. Examples: not wearing protective gear, not using
cushioning in boxes, not taping unarmed M42 submunitions as
prescribed. Under certain circumstances, deviation from
procedures for large scale clean-up operations is authorized (s(
Exhibit 45). However, this deviation should be a conscious
choice with careful consideration of risks and alternatives
including chain of command involvement, not a decision by defau:
or insufficient supervision as it appeared to be in this case.
J. EOD technical and command supervision was inadequate f(
an operation of this magnitude-and duration.
(1) A control Team is the normal command and control
element..for multiple EOD detachments. The 146th ordnance
Detachment (EOD) had no such headquarters. The magnitude, scop(
and duration of the Doha clearance operation dictate the
requirement for one. The absence of a Control Team increased tl
burden on the 111th ordnance Group and the detachment itself to
fulfill such a role. Neither unit took noticeable measures to
compensate for not having a Control Team during this extensive
operation.
(2) has commanded the 146th Ordnance
Detachment (EOD), an Active Component unit,
He lefl
Doha on and departed for leave on during the
middle of the operation. Accordi to his immediate supervisor,
Commander, 111th ordnance Group, there were several
contributing factors in permitting h m to go: the leave was
already scheduled,~ ~~had personal reasons to go, no
other time was any better and was trying to adhere t(
the theater's liberal lea~e po cy.
(3) According to part of his reason for
going on leave was that his NCOs told him he was "burned out" ai
needed a break. He agreed. Regardless of the reason, the timil
of the leave was inappropriate, given the scope and complexi~.y
the mission. Althou he trusted his personnel, trust was not
the issue. failed to arrange for the essential
leadership and technical supervision f or such a large clearance
operation during his absence. Over four years in command of a
unit facing the continuous stress involved in EOD could lead to
such a lapse in judgment.
(4) The 146th ordnance Detachment's (EOD) higher
headquarters, 111th Ordnance Group, made no known visits to the
146.th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) personnel at Doha bet,4een the
4
5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)
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