END NOTES

[1] Tab A lists acronyms, abbreviations, and a glossary.

[2] In 1994, a Marine Corps investigation concluded this Marine was not suffering from any classical chemical warfare exposures. I Marine Expeditionary Force, "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted], USMC, to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm, Finding 36," February 22, 1994; and "Statement of GySgt George Grass from Lieutenant General [redacted]'s investigation on possible exposure of [redacted] to chemical agents during Operation Desert Storm," January 11, 1994.

[3] Testimony of Task Force Ripper NBC officer before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, November 18, 1993.

[4] Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.

[5] Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

[6] Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, Government Reform and Oversight House Committee, December 10, 1996.

[7] Department of Defense, Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD," Chapter 11, "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," p. 9.

[8] Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC: Insignia Publishing, 1997, p. 38.

[9] Central Intelligence Agency, "Persian Gulf Special Summary, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Summary," September 1990, p. 8.

[10] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability and Posturing," undated [but prewar], p. 2-3.

[11] The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq did not identify any other ground munitions as mustard-filled. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 656-657.

[12] US Army Central Command, Intelligence Report, "Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions," March, 1991. p. 1.

[13] US Marine Corps Central Command, Message 0313592 Feb 1991, p. 1.

[14] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 49.

[15] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p.18-19.

[16] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 20.

[17] Personal notes of Task Force Ripper commander, undated, p. 1.

[18] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 80, 97-98.

[19] 7th Marines Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 1. See entry times for the prisoner disclosures at 1643 (4:43 PM) and 1733 hours (5:33 PM).

[20] Testimony of Task Force Ripper Commander to Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing, February 27, 1997, p. 36.

[21] MOPP-4 is the highest protective posture and includes wearing a gas mask and rubber gloves. The glossary further explains MOPP.

[22] Lead Sheet 5299, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, June 17, 1997, p. 1; Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 11; and Lead Sheet 5156, Interview with commander, 245th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Detachment, US Army, May 20, 1997, p. 1.

[23] Lead Sheet 5156, Interview of commander, 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 20, 1997, p. 1; and Lead Sheet 5181, Interview with member of the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 30, 1997, p. 1.

[24] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 89.

[25] Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 7.

[26] Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 8, 9, 13-14. The glossary more completely describes the M256A1.

[27] Lead Sheet 5357, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC Executive Officer, p. 1; Interview of 1st MARDIV NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 39-40.

[28] Lead Sheets 5156 and 10320, Interview of commander, 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 20, 1997, p. 1 and 3.

[29] There were three 1st MARDIV command posts: the main which was located towards the division rear; the forward command post which was with the main force body and the mobile command post which was closest to the front. Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 10.

[30] Lead Sheet 5354, Interview with Task Force Grizzly commander, June 30, 1997, p. 1.

[31] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 97.

[32] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 94.

[33] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 83.

[34] Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 90.

[35] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[36] 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 1. Although dated February 24, this log actually details both February 24 and February 25, 1991.

[37] 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "1st Combat Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991, p. 1.

[38] 3d Tank Battalion, "3d Marine Tank Log," February 25, 1991, p. 69.

[39] Lead Sheet 3873, Intervew with 3d Tank Battalion commander, May 15, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5273, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion logistician, June 17, 1997, p. 1; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997, p. 2.

[40] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 1.

[41] Interviews with those in the Task Force Ripper resupply train have not resulted in additional knowledge about this alert. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5273, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion logistician, June 17, 1997, p. 1

[42] "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare (as of June 28, 1999)

[43] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997, p. 2; and 7th Marines Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log for February 24, 1991," p. 2.

[44] For more information on this alert see Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, "11th Marines" (Case Narrative), May 31, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/11marines_ii.

[45] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[46] 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January-June, 1991," February 23, 1991, p. 1.

[47] Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 1 and 1; Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 wheelman, July 2, 1997, p. 1; Interview with GySgt Grass, February 1997, p.11; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons Use in Desert Storm," undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1.

[48] Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 1 and 1; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons use in Desert Storm," Undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1.

[49] Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 12.

[50] See Tab F for more information on the Fox Vehicle; also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[51] "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare (as of June 28, 1999); and Lead Sheet 764, Interview of Fox expert, NBC Reconnaissance Systems, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, now the US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Edgewood, Maryland, May 28, 1996, p. 1-2. The sampling tube draws in approximately 300 times LESS air volume than do other detectors, such as the M43A1 specifically designed to detect vapor.

[52] Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 1 and 1; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons Use in Desert Storm," undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1; and Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 19.

[53] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 8 and 15, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[54] Facsimile from program manager, NBC Defense Systems, Subject: "Interferents," December 7, 1998, p. 2.

[55] US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, p. 5-2, 5-3.

[56] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, Tab C, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[57] US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, p. 5-2, 5-3.

[58] Lead Sheet 23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, May 6, 1999, p. 2.

[59] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[60] Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 3 and 1; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons Use in Desert Storm," undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 wheelman, July 2, 1997, p. 1; Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p.19; and Testimony of MM-1 operator to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997, p. 142-143.

[61] Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 21. GySgt Grass says he reported the alert to the 3d Tank NBC officer, but both the 3d Tank and Ripper NBC officers remember him reporting to Ripper while the 3d Tank NBC officer monitored. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, 30 June 1997, p. 2.

[62] Lead Sheet 10899, Interview of MM-1 operator, December 12, 1997, p. 3; and Testimony of MM-1 operator to the Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997, p. 142-143.

[63] Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1.

[64] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[65] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[66] This graphic is as the Task Force Ripper NBC officer drew it for "Statement for the Investigation into the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [redacted] to Chemical Agents While Serving in South West Asia," December 14, 1993, p. 3.

[67] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[68] 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 2.

[69] 3d Tank Battalion, "3d Marine Tank Log," February 25, 1991, p. 69-70.

[70] 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January-June, 1991," February 23, 1991, p. 1.

[71] 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 7.

[72] The M-256 will detect some agent types (e.g., nerve and blister) within 15 minutes, but to ensure no chemical warfare agents (including blood agent types) are present, the test should be run to its conclusion. "The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June, 1994, p. 35.

[73] After the war United Nations Special Commission inspectors did not find this chemical warfare agent. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 656-657.

[74] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997, p. 2.

[75] 3d Tank Battalion, "3d Marine Tank Logs," February 25, 1991, p. 1.

[76] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/; Sidell, Frederick R., John S. Urbanetti, William S. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, eds., Part I: "Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997, p. 201. web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[77] Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 22-25.

[78] Pre-war reports stated Iraq possessed "Dusty Mustard," a powder form, but United Nations Special Commission inspectors did not find this chemical warfare agent after the war. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 656-657.

[79] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999); Sidell, Frederick R., John S. Urbanetti, William S. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, eds., Part I: "Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997, p. 201.

[80] US Army Field Manual 3-100, "NBC Operations," Washington, D.C., 17 September 1985.

[81] Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 27; Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; See also the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[82] Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 29; and Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/.

[83] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[84] Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 13, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5310, Interview with 1st Marine Division Fox MM-1 operator, June 19, 1997, p. 1.

[85] Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 13, 1997, p. 2.

[86] Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 28.

[87] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 6, 7, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[88] Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 13, 1997, p. 1

[89] 3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, "3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment Log," February 25, 1991.

[90] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[91] 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology, 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment," February 26, 1991.

[92] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[93] Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, "11th Marines" (Case Narrative), May 31, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/11marines_ii.

[94] Lead Sheet 5354, Interview with Task Force Grizzly commander, June 30, 1997, p. 1.

[95] Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 commander, June 19, 1997, p. 1.

[96] The glossary describes M-8 Detection Paper.

[97] For an explanation of the procedures used to identify and destroy unexploded ordnance, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/. Also see "EOD Situation Report for the period 23 February 1991 through 31 March 1991," Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16, April 10, 1991, enclosures 1 and 3; and Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 commander, June 19, 1997, p. 1.

[98] Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 commander, June 19, 1997, p. 2.

[99] Lead Sheet 5277, Interview with commander, 1st Platoon, 2d Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal, May 16, 1996, and June 17, 1997, p. 2, 4; Lead Sheet 5278, Interview with major, 2d Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordinance Disposal, May 16, 1996, and June 18, 1997, p. 1, 2; Lead Sheet 5296, Interview with member of 1st Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, June 17, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5331, Interview with member of 1st Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, June 24, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet 5390, Interview with member of 1st and 2d Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, July 2, 1997, p. 1.

[100] US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Memorandum, "Ordnance Destroyed in SWA,", June 19, 1997. Note, Table A shows all US Marine Corps ordnance found unfit to transport back to the US and destroyed in place, as well as some foreign ordnance.

[101] The United Nations, Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657.

[102] Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996, p. 2.

[103] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Subject: Questions Submitted by Persian Gulf Illness Group," June 19, 1997, p. 1.

[104] Watts, Barry D., and Dr. Thomas A. Kearny, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II: "Operations and Effects and Effectiveness," Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 109.

[105] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud BallisticMissiles" (Information Paper), February 22, 2001, p.18-19, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/scud_info_ii/.

[106] In a statement before the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses on July 29, 1997, Mr. Charles Duelfer, UN Special Commission, confirmed this assessment. Major Thomas P. Cross of the PAC asked, "Do you see any evidence where any weapons were moved from the three lower depots, actually down into Kuwait, maybe brought back at some time?" Mr Duelfer answered, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place other than what is described here," referring to munitions' movements to and from depots near Baghdad and three closer depots, of which the southernmost (and closest to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) was Khamisiyah.

[107] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses," June 23, 1997, p. 1.

[108] The chemical substance to which this Fox Vehicle alerted at an ammunition supply point in Kuwait City was benzyl bromide. See Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/; and US Army Chemical Biological Defense Command Memorandum for Record, Subject: "Summary of MM-1 Spectra Checked re: Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) ," February 15, 1994.

[109] Lead Sheet 5431, Interview of Fox expert, July 9, 1997, p. 1.

[110] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[111] Memorandum from Bruker Daltonics to Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997, p. 1 .

[112] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.

[113] Sidell, Frederick R., John S. Urbanetti, William S. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, eds., Part I: "Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997, p. 208-212.

[114] Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 wheelman, July 2, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5359, Interview with Fox driver, June 27, 1997, p. 1; and Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p.11.

[115] Lead Sheets 5353, Interview with Fox driver, May 31, 1996, p. 1.

[116] Lead Sheet 23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, May 6, 1999, p. 2.

[117] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 32.

[118] "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of July 2, 1999).

[119] Ford, Michael S. and W. E. Newton, "International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, abstract, April 1989, p. 21.

[120] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5212.5D, "Navy and Marine Corps Records Disposition Manual," April 22, 1998, p. III-6-3.

[121] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[122] US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.

[123] US Army Field Manual 101-5-1, US Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-2A, "Operational Terms and Graphics," September 30, 1997, p. 1-37, web site, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/F545/f545-m.htm (as of August 2, 2000).

[124] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 6, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[125] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 3, p. 57.

[126] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents," p. 4, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of October 12, 1999).

[127] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper),
March 27, 2001, p. 3-4, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[128] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31.

[129] US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.

[130] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 39.

[131] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

[132] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

[133] US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 2, p. 4.

[134] US Army Field Manual 101-5-1, US Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-2A, "Operational Terms and Graphics," September 30, 1997, p. 1-120, web site, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/F545/f545-m.htm (as of August 2, 2000).

[135] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper),
March 27, 2001, p. 2, 8, 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

[136] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I (as of August 23, 1999).

[137] Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/06258.html (as of September 2, 1999).

[138] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. As of June 26, 2001, 174 states have signed, ratified, or accepted to it. The United States signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified the Convention on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. We found other protocols and guidelines in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.

[139] 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 7.

[140] 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion Jan-Jun 1991," undated.

[141] 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "1st Combat Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991, p. 1.

[142] 11th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991," March 13, 1991.

[143] 11th Marine Regiment, "11th Marines War Journal, G-Day (24 February 1991)," undated.